Showing posts with label private equity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label private equity. Show all posts

Friday, August 3, 2012

Private Equity, Obfuscatory Advertising, and Making Health Care a Commodity: Lessons from Cerberus Capital Management

The use of advertising by Steward Health Care, currently a regional hospital system here in New England, continues to provide lessons about how public relations and marketing may be used to shape the health care policy debate.  Stand by because the story is convoluted.

Steward Promotes "New Health Care," Whatever That May Be

This week, Commonwealth reported on Steward's latest high profile advertising campaign in the Boston area,

Steward Health Care is using the Olympics to hone its image. The Boston-based chain of 10 community hospitals, many of which were on the verge of going under when Steward acquired them, is running a series of ads on WHDH-TV (Channel 7) during Olympics coverage that cast the company as a delivery system for a new type of world-class health care.

While visible, the advertisements are notably vague. One features
a Steward employee who says she believes 'world class health care is here.' Another of the initial ads features individual doctors and technicians pledging to be stewards of 'the new health care,' which is the tagline for all of the Steward ads.

What the 'new health care' means is never fully explained in the ads

One local health care expert
Paul Levy, the former CEO of Beth Israel Deaconness Medical Center, said he thinks the ads are part of a campaign by [Steward Health Care owner] Cerberus [Capital Management] to make Steward more attractive to would-be buyers. 'This has very little to do with anything other than establishing the image and the brand of the Steward hospitals so when the day comes when Cerberus sells the company it will be better received in the public markets,' Levy said.

The article had noted that
Cerberus Capital Management, a New York private equity firm, owns Steward,...

So it is possible that no one at Steward really has any idea what sort of "new health care" the organization is promoting

Steward's CEO Promotes Health Care as a Commodity

However, there is reason to think that the top leadership of Steward, and probably of Cerberus Capital Management, the private equity group that owns it, actually does have a clear idea what new health care they are promoting.

Almost simultaneous with the Commonwealth article and the Olympic advertising campaign an interview appeared with Steward's CEO in Fortune. CEO Dr Ralph de la Torre first pitched medicine as science,
A lot of us physicians went into medicine because we loved the art aspect of it. There wasn't a lot of real hard-core science when many of today's doctors went into medicine. It was your intuition, your abilities, the gestalt of what was going on. But something happened in medicine along the way. It started becoming a real science, and a lot of studies have come out that guide what we do and how we do it. We as a society need to understand that science has to guide our practice of medicine. Not everyone with a headache needs a CAT scan; not everybody with a sprained ankle needs an MRI.

This sounds like it could be an affirmation of evidence-based medicine, the approach that attempts to base medicine on systematic search for and critical review of the best clinical research, among other things. However, De la Torre takes it a big step further, citing:
In deference to those who love the individual hospital, you have to look back at America and the trends in industries that have gone from being art to science, to being commodities. Health care is becoming a commodity. The car industry started off as an art, people hand-shaping the bodies, hand-building the engines. As it became a commodity and was all about making cars accessible to everybody, it became more about standardization. It's not different from the banking industry and other industries as they've matured. Health care is finally maturing as an industry, and part of that maturation process is consolidation. It's getting economies of scale and in many ways making it a commodity.

Apparently Dr De la Torre does not see a distinction any longer between health care, or to use an old-fashioned word, medicine, traditionally considered an art or practice of caring for individual patients, and making automobiles on an assembly line. Dr De la Torre may be deeply misinterpreting evidence-based medicine, which is about evidence from clinical research, but also much more. Consider how the Cochrane Collaboration discusses it:
Evidence-based health care

Evidence-based health care is the conscientious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients or the delivery of health services. Current best evidence is up-to-date information from relevant, valid research about the effects of different forms of health care, the potential for harm from exposure to particular agents, the accuracy of diagnostic tests, and the predictive power of prognostic factors [1].

Evidence-based clinical practice is an approach to decision-making in which the clinician uses the best evidence available, in consultation with the patient, to decide upon the option which suits that patient best [2].

Evidence-based medicine is the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. The practice of evidence-based medicine means integrating individual clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research [3].

[1] Cochrane AL. Effectiveness and Efficiency : Random Reflections on Health Services. London: Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1972. Reprinted in 1989 in association with the BMJ. Reprinted in 1999 for Nuffield Trust by the Royal Society of Medicine Press, London, ISBN 1-85315-394-X.[2] Gray JAM. 1997. Evidence-based healthcare: how to make health policy and management decisions. London: Churchill Livingstone.
[3] Sackett DL, Rosenberg WMC, Gray JAM, Haynes RB, Richardson WS. 1996. Evidence based medicine: what it is and what it isn't. BMJ 312: 71–2 [3] [Full text]

Note the emphasis on making decisions for individuals based on what is best for each, and the integration of evidence from clinical research with clinical expertise. This is far from commoditization.

Nonetheless, Dr De la Torre seems to envision "new health care" like a 1930s automobile assembly line, with the physicians and other health professionals cast as assembly line workers, and the patients cast as automobiles.

Our next example may provide some explanations for this point of view.

Steward's Advertising Raises Questions of Whose Hands Should be on Health Care

As we discussed earlier, Steward Health Care has been working on acquiring a struggling local Rhode Island hospital system, and in doing so is in a dispute with the statewide non-profit Blue Cross health insurance company. Steward had been putting daily full-page advertisements in the local paper. A recent version (27 July, 2012), had this text:
RHODE ISLAND TO BLUE CROSS:
GET YOUR HANDS OFF OUR HOSPITALS

With 80% of the market under its control, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island thinks it can decide which hospitals survive or fail. The people of Rhode Island beg to differ.

For the past decade, they've watched Blue Cross starve Landmark Medical Center of its funding. And this year, when Blue Cross issued an ultimatum to terminate the hospital, Rhode Islanders heard enough.

In a poll conducted this week by John Marttila, a nationally recognized leader on public attitudes concerning health care, 76% of respondents said that Blue Cross shouldn't be allowed to use their monopoly to dictate the fate of Rhode Island hospitals. They also felt, by a 2-1 margin, that if Landmark did indeed close, Blue Cross would be to blame.

However, soon after, investigative reporting by the Providence Journal's Ms Felice Freyer revealed that maybe the poll should have been interpreted differently. Not unexpectedly, Ms Freyer revealed the poll to have been "commissioned by Steward." Its basic results were really:
Just over half the respondents knew that Landmark was being sold to Steward, and of those, 58 percent did not have an opinion, 29 percent supported the sale, and 13 percent opposed it. However, among those who knew about the sale and also live in northern Rhode Island, the approval rating was higher –– 37 percent support the sale, with 15 percent disapproving and 48 percent having no opinion.

The pollster than provided prompting, perhaps in an attempt to get results more favorable to its client:
One of the questions starts with this statement: 'Blue Cross Blue Shield provides health insurance to 80 percent of Rhode Island. By refusing to negotiate on reimbursement rates, Blue Cross can essentially determine if hospitals in the state stay open or if hospitals close.' Based on that statement, 76 percent of respondents agreed that 'Blue Cross should not be allowed to use its monopoly to dictate which hospitals stay open and which close their doors.'

Unfortunately, it appears that the prompting statement was perhaps not fully accurate:
In 2011, Blue Cross covered 66 percent of Rhode Islanders with private health insurance, not 80 percent, according to a report by the Office of the Health Insurance Commissioner.

Blue Cross denies that it has refused to negotiate.

'We have negotiated in good faith and have offered a fair contract to Landmark Hospital that is consistent with our reimbursement arrangements for other independent hospitals,' Blue Cross said in a statement. 'Unfortunately, Steward has been unwilling to enter into a contract under those conditions.'

While they touted probably methodologically biased survey results, Steward's local advertising campaign's headline might prompt some people to think about whose hands should really be on their health care. The advertising tries to limit this question to Blue Cross' influence. However, one might also ask whose hands control Steward Health Care?

Whose Hands are on Steward Health Care?

As the Commonwealth article above pointed out, Steward Health Care is a wholly owned subsidiary of Cerberus Capital Management, a New York based private equity firm.

Cerberus' top leadership includes
- CEO Steven A Feinberg, who, as we noted previously, was listed as number 21 on a list of the 25 most powerful businessmen in 2007 by Fortune, at that time running through Cerberus 50 companies with total revenues of $120 billion.  On Wikipedia, his net worth was estimated as $2 billion in 2008.
- Chairman John W Snow, who, as we noted previously, resigned as Treasury Secretary in the administration of President George W Bush "in 2006 only because it was revealed that he had not paid any taxes on $24 million in income from CSX, which had forgiven Snow's repayment of a gigantic loan that the company had made to him," according to Chareles Ferguson in Predator Nation.
- Chairman, Cereberus Global Investments J Danforth Quayle, the controversial former US Vice President during the George H W Bush administration.

Furthermore, Cerberus Capital Management, which wholly owns Steward Health Care, owns several other businesses.  As we noted here, these include, DynCorp (see their web-site), which has been called one of the "leading mercenary firms," by an article in the Nation.  As reported by Bloomberg, DynCorp, and hence indirectly about Cerberus, and Steward Health Care, in 2011 settled accusations that it overbilled the US government for construction work in Iraq.   Furthermore, as we noted here, Cerberus also owns the biggest manufacturer of firearms and ammunition in the US. As reported by BusinessWeek in 2010, Cerberus owns 13 brands of fire-arms and munitions under the umbrella Freedom Group.

So while Cerberus Capital Management would like us to believe that Rhode Island residents question the hands of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rhode Island on a struggling local hospital system, it seems to be trying to avoid questions about whose hands would be on the hospital system were Cerberus Capital Management's subsidiary Steward Health Care to acquire it. 

Summary

So, to recapitulate this winding story....   A regional hospital system has been pushing its "new health care" idea.  However, its former surgeon CEO promotes new health care as commoditized health care, assembly line health care, in which doctors become assembly line workers and patients become widgets.  This seems bizarre until one realizes that the CEO actually works for a huge private equity firm whose goal is to make a lot of money in the short-term.  Standardized, commoditized health care is likely to be cheaper to provide than individualized health care.  Private equity firms thrive by cutting their subsidiaries' costs, and then selling them quickly, sometimes before the long-term consequences of these cuts become apparent.  (Look here.)

So there are two lessons.

To repeat the lesson from our earlier post, everybody, doctors, other health care professionals, health policy makers, patients, and the public ought to be extremely skeptical of the marketing and public relations efforts of big health care organizations.  Based on the examples above, they ought to be particularly skeptical of organizations that are overtly for profit, and/or have a clear focus on short-term revenue generation.  As a society we need to think about how to best counter these biased, incomplete, sometimes grossly deceptive efforts to manipulate public psychology and opinions through our rights to free speech and a free press.

To add a lesson, everybody, doctors, other health professionals, health policy makers, patients and the public ought to be extremely wary of the ongoing corporatization of medicine and health care.  Corporate leaders who often get large incentives for maximizing short term revenue are likely to be enthused about turning our health care into a commodity.  Doctors and health care professionals should not want to be assembly line workers, and patients surely should not want to be widgets. 

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

Private Equity vs Patient Care - a Bainful Example

A long investigative report in Salon summarized allegations about the quality of care in various treatment centers owned by Aspen Education, and its parent company, CRC Health Group, in turn wholly owned by a private equity firm, Bain Capital.  The article provides examples of what can go wrong when health care organizations are taken over by remote leadership focused overwhelmingly on short-term revenue.   

A Death from a Treatable Disease
The report opened with the investigation of a 14 year old resident at Youth Care, in Salt Lake City, and Aspen Education treatment center.  Brendan Blum "died of a twisted-bowel infaction," according to the local medical examiner, which allegedly went untreated because "two poorly paid monitors on duty," were slow to seek approval to call for emergency services, and "were too low on the totem pole to call 911 themselves."

The article cited "previously unreported allegations of abuse and neglect in at least 10 CRC residential drug and teen care facilities across the country."  It charged, "such incidents have largely escaped notice because the programs are, thanks to lax state regulations, largely unaccountable." 

Allegations of Toxic Corporate Culture

The article noted numerous other reports of unexplained and allegedly wrongful deaths, and other allegations of mistreatment of patients.

Furthermore, the article noted allegations "that such incidents reflect, in part, a broader corporate culture at Aspen's owner, CRC Health Group, a leading national chain of treatment centers.  Lawsuits and critics have claimed that CRC prizes profits, and the avoidance of outside scrutiny, over the health and safety of its clients." 

We have frequently discussed how the corporate culture of the finance industry, the industry that brought us the global financial collapse/ great recession, has influenced health care, and how this culture may be related to extensive problems with the leadership of health care, including lack of understanding of or even outright hostility to the health care mission, the prioritization of self-interest over the mission, conflicts of interest, and even outright criminal behavior, such as fraud, and kick-backs (bribery).  One way that finance may influence health care is the presence of finance leaders on the boards of trustees of non-profit health care institutions (see recent examples here and here). 

A more direct way the culture of finance can influence health care is for private equity firms (that is, re-branded leveraged buyout firms, look here) to purchase organizations that actually take care of patients.  The Salon article noted:

CRC’s corporate culture, in turn, reflects the attitudes and financial imperatives of Bain Capital, the private equity firm founded by Mitt Romney. (The Romney campaign also did not reply to written questions.) Bain is known for its relentless obsession with maximizing shareholder value and revenues. Indeed, this has become a talking point of late on the Romney campaign trail; he bragged to Fox in late May that '80 percent of them [Bain investments] grew their revenues.' CRC, a fast-growing company then in the lucrative field of drug treatment, was perhaps a natural fit when Bain acquired it for $720 million in 2006. In conversations with staff and patients who spent time at CRC facilities since the takeover, there are suggestions that the Bain approach has had its effects. 'If you look at their daily profit numbers compared to what they charge,' Dana Blum [the mother of the boy who died in the incident discussed above] said of CRC’s Aspen division in 2009, 'it’s obscene.' That point, ironically enough, was underscored by the glowing reports in the trade press about its profitability.

The article discussed how Bain Capital's acquisition of CRC Health Group further tilted the balance towards short-term revenue and away from quality care:
When Bain purchased CRC, it looked like an investment masterstroke. The company, founded in the mid-’90s with a single California treatment facility, the Camp Recovery Center, had quickly grown into the largest chain of for-profit drug and alcohol treatment services in the country, with $230 million in annual revenue. Under Bain’s guidance, its revenue has nearly doubled, to more than $450 million. CRC now serves 30,000 clients daily — mostly opiate addicts — at 140 facilities across 25 states. In the first five years after its acquisition, Bain had already extracted nearly $20 million in management-related fees from the chain, although Bain investors haven’t cashed in yet through dividends or an IPO. Bain’s purchase, a leveraged buyout, also saddled CRC with massive debt of well over $600 million.

According to company executives and independent analysts, hands-on oversight of subsidiary companies is a hallmark of both Bain and CRC. Romney’s campaign literature boasts about Bain taking exactly this sort of direct role in helping to turn around failing companies. 'Over the life of an investment, they have a strong management team willing to participate,' Sheryl Skolnick, an analyst with CRT Capital, a leading institutional brokerage firm, says of Bain.

The CRC acquisition immediately made Bain owner of the largest collection of addiction treatment facilities in the nation. Unlike some Bain Capital acquisitions, which led to massive layoffs, the company’s approach with CRC was to boost revenues by gobbling up other treatment centers, raising fees, and expanding its client base through slick, aggressive marketing, while keeping staffing and other costs relatively low. But that rapid pace of acquisition couldn’t be sustained in the mostly small-scale drug treatment industry alone. So Bain Capital and CRC set their sights on an entirely new treatment arena: the multibillion-dollar 'troubled teen' industry, a burgeoning field of mostly locally owned residential schools and wilderness programs then serving, nationwide, about 100,000 kids facing addiction or emotional or behavioral problems.

One of CRC’s first acquisitions under Bain ownership was the Aspen Education Group. Founded in 1998 with about six schools, Aspen Education had expanded to 30 troubled-teen and weight-loss programs by 2006, including Youth Care of Utah. With Bain’s backing, CRC purchased Aspen for nearly $300 million in the fall of 2006.

Less than a year later, Brendan Blum was dead.

At the time of the CRC acquisition, Aspen already had a history of abuse allegations, including at least three lawsuits, and two known patient deaths, one by suicide. Featured on 'Dr. Phil,' it grew out of schools inspired by the 'tough-love' behavior-modification approach of the discredited Synanon program, which was eventually exposed as a cult. By 2006, Aspen was facing a wrongful death lawsuit, later settled, over an incident in 2004 in which a 14-year-old boy, Matthew Meyer, perished from heat stroke just eight days into his stay at its Lone Star Expeditions wilderness camp in Texas.

This just underscores concerns we raised here about how ownership by private equity could undermine the ability of health care organizations to fulfill their missions. At the time we worried that private equity's short time horizon would clash with health care's long-term focus, how standardized cost-cutting approaches, including emphasis on individual employees' "productivity," could undermine patient care, and how private equity's obsession with secrecy is the antithesis of the transparency required to make health care accountable.

The Increasing Influence of Private Equity

Ironically, the reason that the problems at CRC have gotten such public attention is that the former leader of the private equity firm that controls it is now running for the US presidency. His candidacy emphasizes just how influential the culture of private equity has come.
The purchase of CRC came seven years after [former Massachusets Governor and now Republican presidential hopeful Mitt] Romney publicly announced his retirement as CEO of Bain Capital, where he had been in charge since its founding in 1984. But at the time of his departure, Romney worked out an arrangement to continue to share in Bain’s profits as a limited partner in the firm. Today, he is still an investor in 48 Bain accounts. Though he has refused to disclose their underlying assets, some information about them can be gleaned. For example, he has reported at least $300,000 to $1.2 million, if not more, in fluctuating annual earnings from Bain Capital VIII, the convoluted $3.5 billion array of related funds that owns both name-brand companies such as Dunkin’ Donuts and the lesser-known CRC Health Group. Most of these funds were made more attractive to privileged investors by being registered in the Cayman Islands tax haven. And Romney’s connections to CRC run even deeper: Of the three Bain managing partners who sit on CRC’s board, two, John Connaughton and Steven Barnes (with his wife), gave a total of half a million dollars to Restore Our Future, the super PAC supporting Romney. They also each donated the $2,500 maximum directly to his campaign.

Furthermore, it provides a warning about much more influential it might become, particularly in regard to health care:
Romney has been outspoken about his belief that for-profit health care companies can flourish only without onerous regulations. 'I had the occasion of actually acquiring and trying to build health care businesses,' he said during a primary debate last year. 'I know something about it, and I believe markets work. And what’s wrong with our health care system in America is that government is playing too heavy a role.'

The allegations against one of those health care businesses suggest another viewpoint.

I have frequently repeated a contention that true health care reform would emphasize leadership of health care organizations that understand and uphold the values of health care, starting with prioritizing the needs of patients and the public's health over all other concerns. Instead, there is a danger that health care leaders will be ever more removed from patients and the public, and their health needs, while they become ever more concerned with making as much money as possible in the short-run, and after that, the Devil take the hindmost.

Tuesday, January 31, 2012

How the Anechoic Effect Is Institutionalized - A Hospital Policy Against Unsupervised Discussion with the Media

In a single sentence, a short, obscure article in the Worcester (MA) Business Journal on life at a community hospital after a for-profit corporate take-over:

Several Nashoba employees, who didn't want their names used because it's against hospital policy to talk to the media without authorization, said they're happy with the new insurance plan.

We have often discussed the anechoic effect, how cases involving or discussions of the topics we address on Health Care Renewal, the concentration and abuse of power in health care, fail to produce any responses, or echoes.  It was almost an aside, but the sentence above provides evidence of the existence of apparently blanket hospital policies against unsupervised discussion with the media. Here is an example of the institutionalization of the anechoic effect.

This example raises three immediate questions. How prevalent is this? How long has it been going on? What is it meant to hide?

Prevalence

This article is only about a single hospital. However, the context of the article is the take-over of Nashoba Hospital by Steward Health Care. Steward Health Care is a for-profit health care corporation that grew out of the take-over of the formerly not-for-profit Caritas Christi health system by the private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management. Steward Health Care now comprises  eight hospitals, and also owns physician practices (apparently including over 2000 doctors based on a quick search using its "doctor finder" function.) Thus it is likely that the policy at Nashoba Hospital that prevents unsupervised discussion with the media also applies at seven other hospitals, and perhaps to the practices of over 2000 doctors. Thus it is very likely that this hospital gag policy is not unique, and may be widespread. However, recursively, the existence of such gag policies will make it hard to determine their own prevalence.

Note that we have posted a few times about confidentiality clauses mainly within physicians' contracts here.

Duration

This policy is likely relatively new, since the take-over of Caritas Christi by Cerberus occurred in 2010. My guess is that the rise of such policies may parallel the resurgence of for-profit hospitals and hospital systems, and perhaps the new involvement of private equity firms in such organizations.

In my humble experience, gag policies and confidentiality clauses at least within non-profit teaching hospitals were virtually unheard of from the time I began medical school (1974) to when I left my last full-time academic medical position (2005).

Note that we recently found out (because of investigative journalism about presidential candidate Mitt Romney's previous involvement with private equity firm Bain Capital) that such firms are generally rebranded leveraged buy-out firms. They have become known for their secretiveness. Therefore, maybe it should not be surprising that they have imposed such secretiveness on hospitals and health care professionals.

Rationale 

The big question is why should hospital employees not be allowed to talk to the media without management supervision? I can only speculate.

In this case, perhaps such secretiveness is just the habit of the private equity executives who now run the hospital system. Even if this is the reason, they ought to reconsider. Hospitals and health care professionals due have a solemn obligation to keep confidential their patients' medical information. However, otherwise health care organizations and health care professionals ought to be as transparent as possible.

Maintaining such a level of secrecy could lead to some suspicions, for example, that the generic managers of the organization distrust the professionals they hire who actually provide patient care; worse, that the managers fear discussion that might question their actions or abilities; worse, that the managers want to silence whistle-blowers; or even worse, that the managers have something unethical or illegal to hide. That is all speculation, of course.

On the other hand, we have discussed again and again how the anechoic effect has stifled discussion of what is wrong with health care, and hence prevented meaningful health care reform. Gagging hospital employees is an obvious extension and institutionalization of the anechoic effect. It should not be done, because we need honest discussion of what is really wrong with health care so we can come up with some real solutions.

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

"Barbarians at the Gate" - Making Private Equity Less Private, and Understanding Its Effects on Health Care

One good byproduct of the tumultuous everlasting 2012 campaign for the US presidency has been to shed light on a number of political and economic issues that had previously been ignored, especially those relating to the global financial crisis or great recession.  In turn, many of these issues may be relevant to our understanding of our ongoing health care dysfunction. 

The latest issue to achieve prominence was the nature of private equity firms.  Current presidential contender Mitt Romney used to work for Bain Capital, a private equity group.  As we discussed here, Bain Capital owned a variety of companies, including some important health care corporations.  More importantly, attacks on Mr Romney's record at Bain by other candidates have lead to a broader discussion of the nature of private equity.  This discussion is very relevant to health care, since private equity firms have taken over a number of important health care corporations, and more recently, have begun to take over formerly non-profit health care organizations.

Therefore, we will summarize what has become known about private equity, and then consider its implications for health care.

Understanding Private Equity as Re-Branded Leveraged Buy-Out Firms

- Private Equity Firms are Just Re-Branded Leveraged Buyout Firms

The first good statement to this effect I found was by Merrill Goozner in the Fiscal Times(1):

Private equity is actually a misnomer, since the modus operandi of those investors is no different than the leveraged buyout firms that pioneered junk-bond financing in the 1980s.

As reported by the Los Angeles Times(2):
'Being known as a leveraged-buyout-deal shop wasn't the most attractive label out there,' said Colin Blaydon, director of the Center for Private Equity and Entrepreneurship at Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business. 'Private equity has a much nicer ring to it.'

In fact, according to Forbes columnist Robert Lenzer,(3) the famed investor Warren Buffet called this re-branding
'Orwellian': Buffett wrote that 'private equity' is a 'name that turns facts upside-down: A purchase of a business by these firms almost invariably results in dramatic reductions in the equity portion of the acquiree’s capital structure compared to that previously existing.'

I must admit I always thought private equity firms simply collected large amounts of capital from investors, then used the pooled capital to buy out troubled firms. I assumed that because these investors therefore had a large personal stake in these firms, they would want to increase at least their financial value. I also thought that leveraged buy-out firms ceased to exist after all the bad press they got in the 1980s. It turns out I was wrong on all counts. Probably, a lot of other peoples' beliefs about private equity were similarly wrong.

Once the equation of private equity and leveraged buyout firms is made, understanding what they do and its implications are easier.

- Leveraging the Buy-Out

The modus operandi of leveraged buyout firms is to make their purchases of troubled corporations mainly with borrowed money. As Merrill Goozner put it(1),
Private equity firms generally finance anywhere from 60 to 90 percent of their purchases with borrowed cash.

Note that,
Interest payments on those debts are treated just like any other expense, and are therefore deductible from earnings.

- Then Leveraging the Acquired Company

If this leveraging were the only leveraging done in a leveraged buy-out, the implications might not be that big, except for the acquiring firm. After all, when the leveraged buy-out firm borrows the money, it then becomes obligated to pay it back. However, then comes the tricks.

One important trick was described in the following example by economist Dean Baker on the Beat the Press blog(4),
To take a simple example, suppose a public company (let's call it Gingrich Inc.), has $1 billion a year in profits. If Gingrich Inc. paid taxes at the full 35 percent rate (fat chance), it would have $650 million [thanks Robert] a year to either keep as retained earnings or to pay out as dividends to its shareholders.

Now suppose that a PE company (we'll call it Romney Capital) steps in. The current price to earnings ratio in the stock market is around 14, so Gingrich Inc. would have a pre-takeover market value of approximately $9.2 billion (14*$650 million). Romney Capital then arranges for Gingrich Inc. to borrow $6 billion which it pays out as a dividend to itself. This means that the Romney Capital has just gotten back almost two-thirds of its investment.

A somewhat less vivid description of the process appeared in a post by Robert K Lifton on the Huffington Post(5):
Most often, in order to increase the return on capital invested by the fund, the fund will borrow a significant portion of the purchase price of the business. And sometimes, if it can, the fund will take back as a distribution immediately upon closing the purchase of the business, a portion of its investment in the purchase price, reducing its own investment and enhancing its return on the investment left in the business. This distribution may come from the company's existing cashable assets or from money that the company is caused to borrow.

Thus, it appears that while the leveraged buy-out (or private equity) firm borrowed money to finance the purchase of a company, it can almost immediately get out of its obligation to pay off that loan, by making the acquired company its own loan, and using proceeds from that to end the LBO firm's debt. The leverage, and the obligation to pay back a debt has almost magically been transferred from the LBO or private equity firm to the acquired company. That has big implications, as Lifton wrote(5):
This additional leverage also creates additional risk; if things don't go right the business will not be able to pay the carrying costs of the debt, the lender will take over the business and the fund will lose its investment. Sometimes, that results in the acquired company placed in bankruptcy proceedings either to liquidate its assets to pay off the debt or to restructure, a process Bain also experienced.

- Selling Assets to Further Reduce the Private Equity Firm's Debt

LBO firms have another trick up their collective sleeves. As Dean Baker continued his example(4),
Now suppose that the Romney Capital arranges to sell off some of Gingrich Inc.'s assets, such as real estate or a highly profitable subsidiary, and then uses the proceeds to make a payment to the Romney Capital rather than leaving the money under the control of Gingrich Inc. Such sales may allow Romney Capital to recoup the rest of its investment and possibly more.

Of course, the result is
Gingrich Inc. is then left as a highly indebted company with few assets.

In this story, Romney Capital may have earned a substantial profit on a limited investment (it recouped most of its money almost immediately when it loaded Gingrich Inc. with debt), without doing anything to improve the operation of Gingrich Inc. If Gingrich Inc. manages to stay in business and generate profits, then this will increase the return. Romney Capital may be able to resell the company and treat the whole sale price as profit.

On the other hand, if Gingrich Inc. goes bankrupt, this will primarily be a problem for creditors, since Romney Capital has already gotten its investment back. In effect, Romney Capital might have secured large gains entirely by financial engineering, while creating no value whatsoever.

Let me underscore that. The LBO model (now also the private equity model) enables the acquiring LBO firm to avoid any losses, by shifting all the risk and obligations to the acquired firms. This puts these firms at considerable jeopardy.

- Tactics to Prepare Acquired Firms for Sale

Of course, LBO/ private equity firms want to do more than not lose money. To make real money, they must be able to sell off the firms they acquire. To do so, they must make these firms, or their components, seem attractive, at least in the short term. To do this, they employ a standard set of tactics out of the generic management playbook.

So, per the LA Times(2),
layoffs are part of the playbook that elite investment firms use to squeeze cash out of struggling companies.

Also, per Lifton(5),
To increase the profits of the acquired company, the fund may reduce the number of employees, reduce pay levels or curtail work time.


In addition, per Josh Barro writing for the Forbe blog(6), other tactics can include
downsizing, increased automation, offshoring, and the like.

- The Private Equity/ Leveraged Buy-Out Version of the Anechoic Effect

It is striking that while Mitt Romney worked at Bain Capital in the last century, and private equity has been around, if not growing, since then, the current presidential campaign seems to be the first occasion which prompted any real public discussion about the nature of private equity, and its significance for the larger political economy. Thus private equity/ LBO seem to have been anechoic for a very long time (like much about how our current health care system operates seems to be anechoic.)

This version of the anechoic effect seems to have been deliberately created by the private equity/ LBO firms.

A Washington Post commentary(7) quoted Mitt Romney,
You know I think it's fine to talk about those things in quiet rooms,...

As a New York Times story(8) put it, these firms are lead by
a group of Wall Street executives who prefer to operate out of the spotlight

A story in Politico(9) called private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms
one of the most secretive redoubts of the American economy

The article went on to suggest that these firms may well have something to hide:
Josh Kosman, author of 'The Buyout of America: How Private Equity Is Destroying Jobs and Killing the American Economy.' [said] 'Most private equity firms are because once you look behind the numbers, there is much they don’t want you to see.'

Furthermore,
Private equity companies often tend to have confidentiality agreements with their investors (Bain would not comment on what agreements it has). Several equity experts interviewed for this story thought any disclosures from Bain were likely to spook its investors.

The private equity business model is based on taking companies out of the public markets, where reporting requirements are strict and investors punishing, making changes that will hopefully make them more profitable and then selling them or taking them public through an IPO.

The part that happens behind the curtain is not always pretty, and private equity firms have learned over the years that it’s hard to tell a complicated story in the media. The goal of private equity is to keep things private.

'It’s had very little consciousness in the political realm until Romney came along because these guys are smart enough not to try to become Treasury secretaries,' said Bill Cohan, a former Wall Street banker-turned-investigative journalist who wrote 'Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came To Rule The World.'

In addition, Dean Baker suggested that the confidentiality is used to hide how private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms remove capital from acquired companies(4),
The sort of asset stripping described here, which harms creditors by taking away potential collateral for their loans, violates the law. However it is extremely difficult to prevent, especially with private equity companies that have to make few public disclosures.

Thus secrecy/ confidentiality/ deception should be regarded as one of the main tactics used by private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms.

Implications for Health Care

Mitt Romney's candidacy has generated a surprising amount of discussion about the effects of private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms on the political economy. Many are worried that despite his claims, such firms cause more job loss than job creation. In the Huffington Post(10), Robert Creamer wrote that private equity/ LBOs have contributed to the sense that ordinary people who play by the rules suffer while well-connected insiders prosper:
It just doesn't make sense to them that a relatively tiny number of people -- who don't build a product or create a service -- can make massive amounts of money, while ordinary people who work hard and play by the rules see their incomes flat-line.

Their view is simple. They create cars, or food, or houses or computers -- or they provide police protection, or care for sick people, or teach our kids. Why should they be asked to sacrifice when guys who basically gamble for a living -- as Wall Street speculators -- make incomprehensibly large sums of money?

There seems to be a good argument that the tactics used by private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms might be bad for the general political economy.

Moreover, these firms often take over health care corporations, drug and device companies, health care information technology companies, health insurance companies, for-profit hospital chains, etc. There is reason to think that their standard tactics used on such targets are likely to be particularly bad for health care.

Many health care corporations depend on a long-term view to be successes. To develop new products, drug, device, and health care IT companies must pursue research and development projects that take years. All health care companies depend on highly trained, specialized workers and professionals. To sustain these sorts of employees requires a long-term attention to their development. So private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms' short-term focus, transfer of debt and risk to the acquired companies, and emphasis on short-term generic management cutting costs techniques including lay-offs, outsourcing, etc clash with the sophisticated long-term focus these companies require.

These health care organizations often require the complex interplay of many components. Private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms' efforts to sequester and sell particular assets may disturb this complex system.

Health care quality, and successful research and development require transparency. Extreme emphasis on secrecy by private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms threatens such transparency.

Even more pointed concerns may arise when private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms endeavor to take over non-profit health care organizations. We plan to discuss these in a subsequent post.

The NY Times(g) noted that in the 1980s, leveraged buy-out firms
were branded as 'barbarians at the gate' - the title of a book [by Burrough and Helyar, link here] about the takeover of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts.

Now 30 years later we are finally having a conversation about the role of these firms in the greater political economy. We in health care should be having a parallel discusion about their role in our sphere. I submit that their role was not likely productive. Since health care should not merely be looked upon as a means to make money, but as a public good, we ought to be talking about how to restrain private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms from doing it more damage.

References

1. Goozner M. Private equity's edge: buy now, deduct taxes later.  Fiscal Times, Jan 9, 2012.  Link here.
2, Hamilton W. Private equity industry: a bad rep, but is it deserved. Los Angeles Times, Jan 12, 2012. Link here.
3. Lenzer R. Why Warren Buffet disdains the private equity crowd. Forbes, Jan 14, 2012. Link here.
4. Baker D. NPR does fluff piece for private equity. Beat the Press, Jan 13, 2012. Link here.
5. Lifton RK. Mitt Romney and Bain Capital: understanding the reality. Huffington Post, Jan 13, 2012. Link here.
6. Barro J. The discussion we should be having about Bain. Forbes, Jan 12, 2012. Link here.
7, Robinson E. Reexamining the myth of no-fault capitalism. Washington Post, Jan 16, 2012. Link here.
8. Lattman P, Lowrey A. As Romney advances, private equity becomes part of the debate. New York Times, Jan 10, 2012. Link here.
9. Hagey K. Mitt Romney's Bain Capital days: a black box. Politico, Jan 11, 2012. Link here.
10 Creamer R. Why the Bain Capital controversy is so damaging to GOP chances this fall. Huffington Post, Jan 16, 2012. Link here.

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

CEOs First to Benefit from For-Profit Takeovers of Non-Profit Hospitals

Last year, we noted concerns about the againy fashionable practice of for-profit corporations taking over previously not-for-profit hospitals and hospital systems. Two examples we cited were the planned acquisitions of Detroit Medical Center (DMC) by Vanguard Health, which was owned by the Blackstone Group, and of Caritas Christi Health Care by Cerberus Capital Management.

At the time, we noted, "for-profit leaders tend to expect even larger compensation than not for-profit CEOs. Their decisions tend to be driven by their short-term compensation, rather than the good of the organization." So we asked, "will making a not-for-profit health care organization into a for-profit corporation really lead to more efficiency and lower costs?" In a later post, we worried about "ever-increasing executive compensation while making money becomes the overwhelming priority for the organization, completely eclipsing such quaint concepts as quality of care, reasonable costs, or adequate access."

About one and one-half years later, we have some follow-up from the media about the results of these deals, especially as they pertain to executive compensation.

Detroit Medical Center, Vanguard Health Systems, Blackstone Group

Our post last year quoted then Mike Duggan, then CEO of DMC, that "We were being choked to death by the nonprofit business model."

This month, the Detroit Free Press reported,

Detroit Medical Center CEO Mike Duggan's total compensation this year from Vanguard Health Systems, the private health care company that bought the DMC, is $2.41 million in pay, bonuses and several years of stock options, up from the $1.98 million in 2009 when DMC was a nonprofit, according to public documents.

About $1.3 million of Duggan's total compensation is in stock options that he would start receiving next year through 2019, the documents show.

Note also that,
The package also calls for Duggan to get $1 million if he's fired or $5 million if Vanguard sells the DMC to another company -- fairly common conditions in contracts, experts said.

Duggan's new compensation package puts him in the top tier of local health care executives.

It seems like Mr Duggan is no longer being "choked to death."

Cursory review of the media reveals that since the acquisition, DMC has some major construction projects planned. However, I saw nothing yet about whether the acquisition has decreased costs, increased access, or improved the quality of care.

I should note that Mr Duggan appears just a bit uncomfortable with his generous compensation in this era of anger about the power of the one percent:
Duggan said he agreed with Occupy Wall Street protesters who point to the growing gap between the poor and rich: "I do believe people should be able to work hard and earn a lot of money. (But) the gap between the top and the bottom is not fair in this country," he said. "I don't have the ability to fix the world, but my wife and I are making a gesture that's appropriate for us. If people say we get paid a lot of money, I think they are right. I'm trying to do something to share some of the benefit."

The gesture mentioned above would be
he and his wife plan to create a foundation next year to hold the stock earnings, after taxes, for scholarships for children of DMC employees.

Whether it is carried out, of course, remains to be seen.

Caritas Christi Health Care, Steward Health Care, Cerberus Capital Management

The initial story about the proposed take-over in the Boston Globe noted that one rationale was how:
Caritas has long struggled financially, but since coming to the chain two years ago, [CEO Dr Ralph] de la Torre has worked to strengthen its financial position by aggressively cutting costs and boosting revenue from medical care. It posted operating income of $30.5 million for the fiscal year ending last Sept. 30 compared with a $20.5 million loss the prior year.

The aim would be:
to provide quality community-based care at a reasonable cost.

Some specific goals of the proposed take-over would be
Under the agreement, Cerberus will invest $430 million to $450 million immediately to pay off Caritas debt, finance renovation projects, and provide working capital, while also assuming its pension liability.

To pursue all this,
While de la Torre and other senior executives will retain their current salaries and benefits, they would be eligible for additional compensation from Cerberus based on the financial performance of the hospitals, Caritas officials said. They said the details of those financial incentives have yet to be worked out.

Last month, a Boston Globe article provided a little more clarity about these compensation arrangements:
Ralph de la Torre, former chief executive of Boston-based Caritas Christi Health Care, drew a total pay package of $2.2 million from the Catholic hospital system in 2009, making him the best-compensated hospital executive in Boston that year, according to documents filed with the state attorney general’s office.

The package, which included base salary, a performance bonus, and incentive compensation linked to improving finances at the hospital chain, marked an increase from the $1.2 million de la Torre earned from Caritas in 2008.

Note that after the take-over, the Caritas Christi system was renamed as Steward Health Care.

So prior to the actual take-over by Cerberus, but presumably while initial negotiations about it were going on, Dr de la Torre had already become the best paid hospital CEO in Boston.

Becker's Hospital Review noted that De la Torre's 2010 total compensation was exactly $2,270,076. The Caritas Christi 2010 IRS form 990 also listed 19 executives who received more than $400,000. Of these, 11 received more than $600,000. Meanwhile, according to this form, the system's losses were accelerating, going from -$6,583,625 in 2008 to -$23,858,733 in 2009.

So, it seems that Dr De la Torre became significantly richer in anticipation of the proposed (and now accomplished) take-over of Caritas Christi by Cerberus Capital Management, even though his hospital system's hemorrhaging of money was increasing at that time.

Again, I was not able to find any clear evidence whether the take-over had decreased costs, increased access, or improved quality of care. I did find one report suggesting that some Steward Health nurses did not think that it had stabilized their pensions as promised. According to the Boston Business Journal,
Nurses and other health care workers from several of the hospitals owned by the for-profit Steward Health Care, plan to protest outside the company's Boston headquarters today at 1:30. They include nurses from St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center, Brighton, Norwood Hospital, Good Samaritan Hospital in Brockton, Morton Hospital in Taunton, Quincy Medical Center Carney Hospital in Dorchester, Holy Family Hospital in Methuen and Merrimack Valley Hospital in Haverhill.

Nurses argue that Steward, owned by New York private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management, has not honored agreements to the workers, including a commitment to create a defined-benefit pension plan. They also say that Steward has threatened to eliminate essential services in retaliation for the nurses demand for the pension plan.

Summary

Two acquisitions by private equity firms of non-profit hospital systems have resulted in increased compensation for the systems' CEOs, and perhaps other top executives.  These increases predated any recognizable improvements in quality or access, or decreases in health care costs.

Acquisitions of non-profit hospitals and hospital systems by for-profit entities, including private equity firms, is one of the newly fashionable ways our health care leaders have promised to improve care, increase access and control costs. The evidence about whether this tactic accomplishes these aims is not yet in. However, it appears that this tactic may be another, and a rapid way for top health care executives to increase their personal incomes.

Health care professionals, patients, and the public at large ought to be increasingly skeptical of the latest fashions in health care management, especially those that have potential to further enrich managers.

As we recently noted, more people in the US and other countries are frustrated that their attempts to work hard and follow the rules of the economic system yield less rewards. Meanwhile, it appears that well-connected insiders are increasingly gaming the system for their personal profit. We have noted how health care executives' compensation seems independent of their talent, skill, or innovation, much less their ability to uphold the values and fulfill the mission of their organizations. Their compensation often seems to rise inexorably, regardless even of the financial status of their organizations.

Now it appears that inflating compensation in anticipation of or due to a merger or acquisition is another mechanism by which insider executives gain, while others in health care lose.

Once more with feeling .... true health care reform requires competent, ethical leadership that upholds health care's core values within a governance structure of accountability, integrity, transparency, and honesty. Tackling the deep problems in health care will require tackling the deeper problems in the global political economy which helped to generate them.