Productive Employment

With desultory interest, I picked up a 1993 novel at the library, The Surgical Arena, by Peter Grant, M.D., “a former navy pilot who became a surgeon.” The following snippet, on page 18, says a lot in a nutshell:

“We’ve got one shot at getting into medical school and that means getting our grades into the top twenty.”

“Why don’t we all just quit and take some gut courses that will prepare us to be brokers,” said Beckwith, one of the veterans. “We can sit on our asses and make a lot of dough.”

“You have to be a crook to be successful in that field,” said Norman. “Besides, you’ll never get any satisfaction out of life unless you put something worthwhile back into it.  I didn’t fight in the infantry to come back and become a broker.”

1993 was the same year that a short-sighted Congress cancelled the Texas supercollider project.  It’s been correctly noted that had that not happened, the recent Higgs-Boson particle observation might have occurred here rather than in Switzerland.  A number of the now-unemployed physicists involved were hired by Wall Street firms.

Although basic banking DOES perform a socially useful function -- firms and individuals DO need capital -- it is very questionable what if anything “banking innovations” (CDOs, derivatives, very rapid short-term computerized trading, etc.) that have proliferated since 1993 have contributed to society.   As Roger Bootle wrote:

For m]uch of what goes on in financial markets . . . [t]he gains to one party reflect the losses to another, and the vast fees and charges racked up in the process end up being paid by Joe Public, since even if he is not directly involved in the deals, he is indirectly through the costs and charges that he pays for goods and services.

In 1995, the assets of the six largest bank holding companies was no more than 17% of GDP, but at the end of 2010, the assets of the six largest bank holding companies were valued at  just over 63 percent of GDP. This financialization of the economy has been at the expense of the rest of us. And finance is now the top area where graduates of Ivy League universities find jobs.

As Dale Carnegie points out, all people – even gangsters like Al Capone – think of themselves as “good guys”.  Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman Sachs’ CEO, is probably sincere when he says he is “doing God’s work”.  But many of us do not agree. Things work as well as they do only because many people are actually still working hard at useful jobs that do contribute to society.  My thanks go to those – and not to the so-called “wealth creators.”

Quantitating the Corruption of Finance Leadership (Who May Overlap with Health Care Leadership)

The bad leadership in health care that we frequently discuss now appears to exist in a context of an increasingly corrupt society.  In particular, we have discussed how the leadership of major health care organizations, such as teaching hospitals, and the universities within which medical schools operate, now frequently interlocks with the leadership of finance.  The ongoing global financial problems have been blamed on bad leadership in finance.

A Survey of Finance Leaders

Now, a survey by a law firm that supports corporate whistleblowers offers some quantitation of the corruption within finance.  The press release for the survey is here, and a summary of results is here.  The survey respondents were 250 US based, and 250 UK based "senior individuals within the financial services industry."

Key results were:

- 24% of those surveyed believed that the rules may have to be broken in order to be successful.

- 25% of UK respondents believed financial services professionals may need to engage in unethical or illegal activity to get ahead; US respondents were only slightly less inclined to engage in wrongdoing at 22%.

- 12% of total respondents believed that it was likely that staff in their company have engaged in unethical or illegal activity in order to be successful.

Perhaps exhibiting ego bias, the senior professionals thought that there competitors were even worse:

39% of total respondents believed it was likely that their competitors have engaged in illegal or unethical activity in order to be successful.

A substantial number of respondents admitted that they would be willing to engage in illegal activity were the circumstances favorable:

16% of total respondents were at least fairly likely to engage in insider trading if they could get away with it. Perhaps more troubling, only 55% of all respondents could say definitively that they would not engage in insider trading if they could make $10 million with no risk of getting arrested.

An important fraction thought that the worked within organizations that encouraged unethical and illegal behavior:

- 30% of all financial services professionals reported feeling pressure to compromise ethical standards or violate the law as a result of their compensation or bonus plan.

- In assessing other pressures that may lead to unethical or illegal conduct, 23% of all respondents also reported feeling other pressures to compromise ethical standards or violate the law.

Note that due to social desirability bias, the survey likely understates these problems.

Comment

Also note that at least so far, this survey is not much less anechoic than much of the evidence of corruption in health care that we have discussed. Although it has been briefly noted in the financial blogs and press, like Reuters, BusinessWeek, and also in the New York Daily News and Los Angeles Times, no other main-stream media has commented yet.

One post on a Forbes blog by Peter Cohan made the weary observation:

Business corruption follows a well-worn path. The boss tells you to bend the rules, and knowing that ignoring that request will cost you your job, you do what you’re told. At the end of the year you get a big bonus and promotion.

Then a disgruntled customer or employee leaks the shady activity to the press or a regulator and your company pays a fine and gets a few weeks of bad headlines. Time passes and the cycle restarts.

He concluded in part:

The conditions that make business corruption pay off have not changed despite numerous scandals — recent ones include Enron, WorldCom, Madoff, and Lehman Brothers – all of which reflect the same conditions that prompted me to write Value Leadership a decade ago: Let executives write their own report cards, base bonuses on those numbers and you will get corruption every time.

The solution is as clear to me as it is impossible to implement. First, all corporate financial reporting must be conducted by highly paid government auditors –rather than by auditing firms that are paid by the companies they audit. Second, performance-linked bonuses must be set aside in escrow accounts for a decade until it’s clear whether the true benefits of business strategies exceed their costs.

As long as there is no limit to how much money companies can put into politicians’ pockets, this fix will never be implemented. That’s because money puts big business in control of politicians who — if they were responding to the interests of the majority of Americans — would eliminate the conditions that make the benefits of business corruption exceed its costs.

But business corruption pays for those who finance Washington campaigns so the soil in which it flourishes remains fertile.

The same is likely to be true of unethical practices by and corruption of health care leadership. After all, health care leaders now mainly come from business management backgrounds, and so have been trained in the same way as financial professionals, and exposed to the same culture that they have experienced. As we have noted, the leadership of health care and finance often overlap. For example, see ours posts on the finance influence on the board of Dartmouth College; the role of the former CEO of bankrupt Lehman Brothers on the board of New York-Presbyterian hospital; the role of finance leaders who derided the Occupy Wall Street as "imbeciles," among other things on the boards of miscellaneous health care organizations; the role of finance leaders on the board of Pfizer, etc, etc, etc.

True health care reform may require larger reform in the greater society.  In any case, we need to reform the culture of health care organizations so that leaders put patients' and the public's health first, and self-interest last.  Furthermore, health care organizations should not provide positive incentives merely for exceeding financial or volume benchmarks, and should provide strong negative incentives for unethical behavior.

Fool Us Once, Shame on You, Fool Us Twice, Shame on Us - The Untrustworthy Pronouncements of Aetna's Former CEOs

A small tempest in the larger US health care reform teapot was produced a few weeks ago when Ron Williams, former CEO of Aetna, declared in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that he no longer supported the health insurance mandate.  The "mandate" for all US citizens to buy health insurance, actually a relatively small tax that would be imposed on people without health insurance, was the central point of contention in the lawsuit before the US Supreme Court challenging the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 

Immediate Past-CEO of Aetna Ron Williams' Abrupt Change of Mind on the Individual Mandate

Williams wrote,

Soon the U.S. Supreme Court will rule on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. I am not a lawyer, or an expert on the Constitution. But as the chairman and CEO of a major health plan, I had a ringside seat to the entire health-care reform process. After much reflection, I have concluded that the federal individual mandate, which requires all Americans to purchase health insurance starting in 2014, will not be upheld.

On this, Williams was soon proven wrong. The Supreme Court upheld the law. However, the tempest was not due just to Williams' reversal of his former opinion, but the role he actually played in pushing his former opinion into the passage of the law, which was really far more than being a "ringside" spectator.

In an August 24, 2009 article, "Aetna's Ron Williams on Health Reform," Forbes' Dan Whelan noted,

Williams, 59, is taking a surprisingly visible role in arguing for change in the health care system. He has met with Obama a half-dozen times (he shrugs off the surname gaffe), has testified four times in front of Senate committees this year and participates in shindigs set up by the many trade groups for which he's a director.

Williams' position echoes that of the HMO industry generally: He's against a government-run plan but favors universal coverage and forcing insurers to take all comers.

As Wendell Potter, the former head of public relations for large health for-profit health insurance company Cigna, who is now a strong industry critic, put it on his blog,

Ron Williams who possibly more than anyone else had persuaded the President to reconsider his campaign pledge to enact reform without making people buy coverage from a private insurer. Candidate Obama’s reform platform differed from those of Hillary Clinton’s and John Edwards’ in only one significant way: both Clinton and Edwards embraced the mandate, which Williams was championing, first behind the scenes and then publicly, on behalf of the insurance industry. Candidate Obama said he didn’t believe it was right for people to be forced to buy something they couldn’t afford.

Williams was the industry’s most visible CEO on Capitol Hill during the debate on reform. He testified at numerous congressional hearings about how essential it was to move the millions of uninsured Americans into private health insurance plans and how an individual mandate was necessary to make that happen. He also never missed an opportunity to trash the idea of a 'public option' to compete with private insurance companies, which candidate Obama had said was essential 'to keep private insurers honest.'

Capitol Hill was not the only place Williams was frequenting during the reform debate. In an August 2009 article in Forbes, Williams was quoted as saying that he already had met with the President six times. When I called the White House to confirm that, a top aide told me it was true Williams had been there many times, adding, 'We’ve found him to be one of the more reasonable ones.'

Williams' recent seeming disavowal of the individual mandate raises the question of why anyone, much less President Obama, trusted him in the first place. After all, he was CEO of Aetna.

2001 Aetna CEO John Rowe Blamed Everyone Else for Health Care Problems

In fact, perusal of my memory, and a few file folders suggested several previous cases in which Aetna CEOs issued pronouncements that should not have been trusted.

First I recalled a meeting in 2001 at Brown during which the then Aetna CEO was honored by giving the Paul Levinger Lecture on "Good Health: Can We Afford It?" (See original Brown news release here.) My memory is that of Dr Rowe blaming just about everybody other than the for-profit health care insurance companies for health care's ills. A Brown Daily Herald article (not currently on line, Baskin B. Health care getting harder to afford, Aetna chief tells Brown U. Brown Daily Herald, November 30, 2001) recounted him blaming "cost inflation," (presumably due to doctors and hospitals), and employers, for whom "quality doesn't matter." He only allowed that insurers were to blame for not giving "better service," but not either rising costs or poor quality. I also recall Dr Rowe being treated with great respect by the audience. After all, this was a prestigious lecture.

However, his talk seemed just the least bit self-serving. If the audience had been aware of his record at the time, maybe we would have been more skeptical.

Mount Sinai CEO Dr John Rowe Extolled Merger with New York University, Jumped to Become Aetna CEO as Merger Began to Fail

By 1993, Dr Rowe was CEO of Mount Sinai Medical Center, and was seemingly at the vanguard of the movement for health care CEOs to be paid a lot. The New York Times reported that the 1993 Chronicle of Philanthropy survey showed him to be the country's best paid non-profit CEO, bringing in total compensation of over $800,000 in 1993 dollars. By 1998, Dr Rowe's big project was pushing concentration of power in health care in the form of a proposed merger between New York University Medical Center and Mount Sinai. According to the New York Times, the plan would be for Dr Rowe to become CEO of the combined entity. At the time, he said,

The advantages of merging hospitals are so great, they far outweigh any hypothetical potential negative impact.

The bond issue needed to finance the merger, however, ran into trouble by early 2000.  Soon after that, Dr Rowe seemingly demonstrated his lack of faith in it by jumping to the leadership of Aetna. It turned out, according to the Hartford Courant, Aetna's offer was just to rich to turn down.

Rowe got a $2 million sign-on bonus to leave Mount Sinai NYU Health and become chief executive of Aetna's health business, the document says. He will also get a $1.4 million retention bonus on July 3, 2001.

Both bonuses are designed to replace money that Rowe forfeited by leaving the giant New York hospital system, Aetna spokeswoman Joyce Oberdorf said.

In addition, Rowe will get an annual salary of at least $1 million and an annual bonus of $1 million to $3 million, depending on how well goals are met, under a three-year employment agreement with two possible one-year extensions.

Rowe, who already received 25,000 shares of restricted Aetna stock and options on 500,000 shares, will get another 100,000 options. The new options will be granted when Aetna spins off its health business to shareholders, or on Jan. 1, 2001 -- whichever comes first. The exercise price will be about $72.73, or whatever price Aetna stock is trading at the time if it's higher than that.

By 2001, the New York Times referred to the merger as existing "in name only." That year, the campuses resumed separate administration. The merger was officially terminated in 2008. Its failure was documented in an Academic Medicine article. (Kastor JA. Failure of the merger of the Mount Sinai and New York University hospitals and medical schools: part 2. Acad Med 2010; 85: 1828-32. Link here.)

If the Brown audience had known that the merger Dr Rowe extolled with such confidence was already failing, but that he was able to leverage his role in its development to go from the country's best paid non-profit CEO to a multi-million dollar a year insurance CEO, maybe we would have felt less guilt about our responsibility for health care's high cost, low access and poor quality.

Aetna CEO Richard Huber's Failure to "Walk the Walk"

In fact, searching through the files showed an even earlier example of an Aetna CEO talking out of two sides of his mouth.

By 1998, an American Medical News article documented the "rocky relations" between Aetna and physicians. By early 2000, Aetna CEO Richard Huber was known as "the managed care executive physicians love to hate," per the American Medical News. His departure was characterized by then American Medical News Street Smarts columnist Dr Scott Gottlieb, as partly due to how

Huber talked out of one side of his mouth about his company's obsessive quest for 'quality' health care -- while out of the other he was screaming at doctors, hospitals and drug firms about controlling costs. Yet Aetna's medical costs were still creeping up. As Richard Huber learned, you can't talk the talk if you don't walk the walk.

Summary

So the unreliability of recent Aetna CEO Ron Williams' advocacy of the "patient mandate," was presaged by similarly untrustworthy pronouncement by two former Aetna CEOs. In each case, the remarks of the particular CEO seemed more designed to promote his immediate self-interest than to provide trustworthy opinion or policy advice.

By the way, this summary should not be viewed as particularly an indictment of Aetna. I am sure I could find equally untrustworthy but self-serving pronouncements from the leaders of many other health care organizations. (Recall the visionary pronouncements of the failed and ultimately jailed CEO of the now vanished Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation, see post here.)

The recent Ron Williams reversal should serve, however, as a stark reminder that we, meaning physicians, other health care professionals, those who study health care and health policy, policy makers, and the public at large, should be very, very skeptical about any pronouncements about health policy by top executives of health care organizations. They as a group have shown themselves to be remarkably good at doing whatever it takes to buttress their immediate self-interest, including making apparently oracular but ultimately foolish policy pronouncements.

The real question is why these pronouncements continue to be treated with reverence, if not as "visionaries,"  by health care professionals, health care and policy researchers, the news media, health care and medical journals, policy makers, politicians, and the public at large? Why has hardly anyone, besides yours truly, gone back to check the accuracy of their previous pontifications before swooning over their latest ones? Why has hardly anyone examined the accuracy of their predecessors' opinions, given that most executives these days seem to be subject to the same incentives to make things look good in the short term, and never mind the consequences?

More Rising Compensation for Executives at Financially Challenged Hospitals, Justified by More Talking Points

In the spring, leaves turn green, and executive compensation turns greener.  The media has provided another set of stories about the inexorable rise of compensation for executives of non-profit hospitals, presented in order of the stories' appearance.

Westchester Medical Center

The Journal-News reported in April,

A Journal News analysis of salary data, obtained through a Freedom of Information request, revealed that 20 hospital administrators received increases in their total compensation for 2010, including one employee whose pay package jumped 18 percent.

Also,

The newspaper’s analysis of data for 2010, the latest year available, shows that 26 administrators at the medical center would have exceeded Gov. Andrew Cuomo’s limit of $199,000 a year for executive compensation. Cuomo signed an order, scheduled to take effect April 15, that restricts the amount of state money that nonprofit organizations can use toward salaries and benefits.

Overall, the medical center spent $11.8 million in compensation to 44 executives in 2010, during which three administrators resigned and three others had their titles downgraded to the director level. The executive payroll rose 11 percent between 2008 and 2010.

In particular,

Administrators who received increases in their total compensation included CEO Israel, who earned the top salary of $1.3 million in total compensation; the chief financial officer; an executive vice president and several senior vice presidents.

However, the fortunes of the top executives were rising at a time of financial trouble for the institution:

That same year, the medical center laid off 130 workers, instituted a hiring freeze and announced an $18 million budget cut for the following year.

'There is no shared sacrifice, there is no appearance of a shared sacrifice,' said Jayne Cammisa, a union representative and a registered nurse in the hospital’s transplant unit.

Those who defended the executives' compensation sounded familiar themes:

Hospital boards rely on compensation committees, outside consultants and market analysis and documentation to justify how much they pay administrators. The medical center uses an outside firm to analyze compensation packages, which are based on market values, [Senior Vice President for Communications Kara] Bennorth said.

The only way to keep the institution and be financially viable is you have to have top management,' [Chairman of the Board Mark] Tulis said.

Note that we briefly mentioned the CEO's compensation in this post.

Connecticut

In May, the Hartford Courant reported,

The health care system may be ailing, but newly compiled data show that compensation for top executives at Connecticut hospitals remains healthy.

Eighteen executives at the state's 30 hospitals made more than $1 million in 2009-10, according to information the hospitals reported to the Internal Revenue Service.

Some of the more notable examples included,

Hartford Hospital's outgoing chief executive officer, John J. Meehan, was the highest paid in Connecticut and one of the highest paid nationally. His compensation totaled $6.98 million – all but $1.1 million of it nontaxable and retirement benefits, according to the hospital.

Also,

In addition to Meehan, Connecticut's 10 highest paid administrators were two Yale-New Haven Health System executives, the departing CEOs at the Hospital of Central Connecticut and the Hospital of St. Raphael, the departing treasurer of Hartford Hospital, the treasurer of the Hospital of Central Connecticut and the presidents of Stamford, Yale-New Haven and St. Francis Hospital and Medical Center. All made more than $1.59 million in 'reportable' W-2 and 1099 miscellaneous compensation.

A few executives had significant 'non-reportable' compensation in addition to W-2 and 1099 pay. The outgoing president at William Backus Hospital in Norwich had $2.2 million in deferred compensation related to his retirement, for total pay of nearly $3 million, according to a C-HIT analysis of the data. The chief operating officer at the Hospital of Central Connecticut had $472,443 in reportable pay and $838,880 in other compensation, for a total of $1.3 million.

Again, there were complaints that executive compensation had nothing to do with the performance of the executives' organizations,

'I don't understand what the hospitals are getting for their money. Some of the highest paid are the worst performing,' said Ellen Andrews, executive director of the Connecticut Health Policy Project in New Haven. 'The system isn't working for anyone – for the state, for the hospitals or for consumers.'

Note, however, that the system is working for the top hired executives.

In response to these complaints, the Courant cited the usual defenses of executive pay:

Others say the compensation reflects the complexity of the health care business, keen national competition for good leaders, and the uncertain future that executives face when they sign on for top-level positions in an industry undergoing enormous change. Pay needs to be competitive to attract and retain key executives, they say – even for nonprofits that are struggling to find their place.

'Hospital executives are responsible for extremely complex organizations,' said Michele Sharp of the Connecticut Hospital Association. In addition to managing advanced medical services and technology, a skilled staff and extensive physical plants, hospital CEOs are often responsible for an array of services beyond the hospital, such as primary care clinics, home health organizations and surgery centers. They work in a highly regulated environment and must comply with demanding standards in areas that range from patient safety and financial performance to institutional stability and community health, Sharp said.

'When you bring in exceptional talent, you can manage effectively and efficiently,' said Vin Petrini, senior vice president for public affairs atYale-New Haven Hospital. 'It's a very complicated and complex industry. We need to be thoughtful about how we manage and retain and recruit talent.'

Wake Forest Baptist

The Winston-Salem Journal uncovered the compensation of several local executives,

A commitment Wake Forest Baptist Medical Center made to Dr. John McConnell, its chief executive, when he was recruited led to a nearly 50 percent increase in his total compensation for fiscal year 2010-11, the center reported Tuesday.

McConnell was paid almost $2.5 million in total compensation, compared with $1.68 million for fiscal 2009-10.

The total included essentials such $25,560 for moving expenses and $9,568 for country club dues.

Other executives did well too:

Donny Lambeth, former president of N.C. Baptist Hospital, had a 36 percent increase in total compensation to $1.16 million. Lambeth now serves as president of Davie County Hospital and Lexington Medical Center. His salary dropped 11 percent to $537,997, while his bonus and incentive compensation rose 165 percent to $186,261.

Dr. Thomas Sibert, president of Wake Forest Baptist Health and chief operating officer, received a 2 percent increase in total compensation to $995,133, including $545,517 in salary and $166,027 in bonus and incentive compensation. Sibert took over his role in September 2010.

Edward Chadwick, chief financial officer, received a 32 percent increase in total compensation to $974,587. His salary rose 71 percent to $503,663 in salary, while his bonus and incentive compensation fell 42 percent to $200,000.

Dr. William Applegate, retired president of Wake Forest University Health Sciences and dean of its medical school, was paid $743,541 in total compensation, down 25 percent. His salary dropped 3 percent to $518,231, while his bonus and incentive compensation fell from $378,900 to $99,900.

Doug Edgeton, former president of Piedmont Triad Research Park, received a 38 percent decrease in total compensation to $655,048. His salary fell 1 percent to $484,360, and his bonus and incentive compensation fell from $361,600 to $111,700.

However, a Winston-Salem Journal article in April noted that the same CEO, Mr McConnell would be aggressively cutting costs and possibly laying off employees:

Wake Forest Baptist Medical Center has told employees it is considering reducing its workforce as part of a major initiative aimed at improving patient outcomes at a lower cost.

The center confirmed Friday a memo sent April 2 by Dr. John McConnell, its chief executive, which addressed what the center is calling 'accelerated transformational initiatives.'

In particular,

In a separate statement, the center said it is looking at expense-reduction opportunities that include 'energy conservation, cost savings through supply chain management, revenue-cycle improvements, efficiencies such as reducing length of stay, reduction in discretionary spending, and managed employment through attrition, retirements, eliminating duplication and process redesign.'

"Managed employment" seems to be the latest circumlocution for layoffs.

The largess given to top executives at a time when lesser employees may be sacked was explained by trotting out the usual suspects,

Wake Forest Baptist said the center is a 'very complex organization that requires a special set of skills and experience to manage relationships with physicians and researchers, the university, its patients and community.'

I wonder if "complexity" comes from a set of talking points, since it gets aired so often in this context.

Note that we discussed compensation given to Wake Forest executives the year before, and its relationship, or lack thereof to the quality of their leadership here.

Summary

There they go again. We have the latest additions to what has become a long series of examples of executive exceptionalism in health care organizations. Top hired executives, be they of for-profit health care corporations, or non-profit organizations, tend to be paid very well, even when their organizations perform poorly or are financially threatened.

The same rationales are cited repeatedly to justify their treatment. Executives are said to have very difficult jobs, Competitive pay is necessary to hire the brilliant people required.  Left unsaid, however, is how difficult these managerial positions are in comparison to the demanding work and sometimes life or death responsibilities of health professionals, how brilliant executives are in comparison to such well trained professionals, and why the executives deserve competitive pay when other employees may be laid off. Perhaps the close ties of those making the arguments to the executives explains the questions they beg.

So it is time to say it again,....  Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.


If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

A Conference on the Psychology of Deception and Unethical Behavior

The Deception, Incentives and Behavior Conference at the Rady School of Management, University of California - San Diego, was attended by over 100 people, including me, indicating that there is real interest in studying deception and unethical behavior in the real world. 

Several presentations had implications for health care, summarized below by theme (titles of presentations follow entries in parentheses).

Context

Several presentations discussed how context affects peoples' inclination to be honest or dishonest. 

Alexander Cappelan,  Norwegian School of Economics, showed evoking a market context, that is, asking people to think about buying or selling something, increased dishonesty, while a personal or intuitive context decreased dishonesty (When do people tell white lies?).

John List, University of Chicago, USA, gave the first plenary talk, suggesting that simply reminding charity fund raisers about the mission of their organization decreased their likelihood of stealing contributions.

Shahar Ayal, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel, suggested that when people can present themselves as ethical, sometimes extremely, maybe harshly ethical in one context, they may then act unethically in another context. (Moral cleansing strategies for ethical dissonance.)

Erin Krupka, University of Michigan, suggested that the availability of voluntary regulation may increase cheating: those who do not cheat may volunteer for regulation, while those who do cheat may point to the availability of regulation. (License to cheat: voluntary regulation and ethical behavior.)

Chen-Bo Zhong, University of Toronto, Canada suggested that being able to delegate increases the likelihood of deception (Deception: an unintended consequence of delegation.)

Keith Murningham, Kellogg School of Management, suggested that priming people by asking them to perform mathematical calculations increases lying, while priming them by reminders about social awareness or family values does not. (The social and ethical consequences of a calculative mindset.)

Incentives

Several  presentations suggested various ways in which incentives may affect honesty.

David Cooper, Florida State University, USA, suggested that the need for long-term credibility may decrease lying.  (Managing credibility: an experiment in leadership and coordination.)

Jan Potters, Tilburg University, Netherlands, suggested that increasing size of incentives to advisors increases the likelihood of their dishonesty when giving advice. (Disclosing advisors' interests neither helps nor hurts.)

Anastasia Danilov, University of Cologne, Germany, suggested that people who get incentives as part of a team who identify most strongly with the team are more likely to lie.  (The dark side of team identity: expermiental evidence from financial service professionals.)

Bill Nielson, University of Tennessee, USA, suggested that people will respond to short-term incentives even at the cost of long-term outcomes. (Temptation, learning and backward induction in sequential decision tasks.)

Michael Vlassopoulos, University of Southampton, UK, suggested that people who get random bonuses, that is, whose incentives are not clearly tied to particular outcomes, are more likely to cheat employers.  (The impact of bonuses on effort provision and cheating.) 

Lisa Ordonez, University of Arizona, USA, suggested that basing incentives on achievement of short-term goals (pay for performance) increases lying about performance. (The impact of goals on ethical behavior.)

Conflicts of Interest

Two presenations discussed conflicts of interest and its effects.

Jan Potters (see above) also found that disclosure of payments to advisors did not not lead them to give more honest advice.

Miriam Mezger, University of Cologne, Germany, presented a poster that suggested that when people must make decisions based on a mixture of advice from unbiased lay-people and conflicted individuals who do not disclose their conflicts, addition of advice from unbiased experts leads to better decisions.(Can experts reduce the impact of deceptive ratings on the internet? - an experiment on product choice with recommendations by managers and experts.)

Summary

The enthusiasm and level of intellectual engagement at the meeting suggested the importance of this field.  However, it was disappointing, but not surprising that the attendance at this meeting did not suggest this topic is yet of concern in health care.  Although the opening remarks by the Dean of the Rady School included a call for participation by people from health care, and other fields such as environmental science, I may have been the only person attending with a health care affiliation. 

Health care could benefit from increased attention to deception, dishonesty and unethical conduct in the field, how it happens, and what can be done to prevent it.  However, as we have often suggested, discussion of such topics is often anechoic because its capacity to offend or threaten those who most benefit from the status quo in health care. 

It was striking that presentations suggested that many practices in our current US commercialized, business-focused health care system may be leading to increased dishonesty and other unethical behavior.  These include thinking about health care in business and quantitative contexts, not in the context of the health care mission to help patients and the public, focus and incentives based on short-term goals, often revenue, and acceptance of conflicts of interest as inevitable and necessary to increase innovation.

Of course, these particular ideas may not make many of our current health care leaders happy.

They do suggest that we could improve honesty and ethics in health care by reminding peole with decision-making authority of the centrality of the health care mission, and the need to improve patients' and the public's health, and to de-emphasize focus and incentives on short-term goals, particularly financial ones.  We also ought to try to minimize, not just tolerate and "manage" conflicts of interest.

The 2011 Best Paid US CEO's Company's Latest Legal Settlement

Yet another legal settlement illustrates the contrast between rewards given to the hired managers of large health organizations and their organizations' performance. 

The New Settlement

The legal settlement in question was simple, as reported by Reuters,

McKesson Corp, one of top U.S. drug wholesalers, has agreed to pay more than $190 million to settle claims that it had violated the federal False Claims Act by reporting inflated pricing information for many prescription drugs, causing Medicaid to overpay for them.

The settlement was announced Thursday by U.S. Attorney Paul Fishman in New Jersey.

According to the government, McKesson reported inflated pricing data to First DataBank, a publisher of drug prices that most state Medicaid programs use to set payment rates for pharmaceutical products.

The government accused McKesson of marking up prices on a variety of drugs by 25 percent between Aug. 1, 2001, and March 31, 2005.

It said McKesson's conduct had caused the United States and individual states to pay inflated reimbursements on Medicaid claims submitted between Aug. 1, 2001 and Dec. 31, 2009.

'We have no tolerance for those who take advantage of that system to bring in more business by falsely increasing reimbursements to retailers,' Fishman said in a statement.

As is typical, the company denied doing anything wrong:

McKesson was not immediately available to comment.

According to settlement papers, McKesson 'expressly denies' the government's charges, as well as those of a whistleblower, David Morgan, in a related civil lawsuit filed in New Jersey federal court. The San Francisco-based company did not admit liability or wrongdoing in agreeing to settle.

It was hardly McKesson's first ethical problem.

McKesson's Track Record

This is just the latest in a long series of legal problems for this company.

The Depression-Era Scandal

Way back in 1938, there was the McKesson & Robbins scandal, one of the major scandals of the depression era. The company had been taken over by one Philip Musica, an accused bootlegger, who committed suicide before a trial (see this post).

In this century, there were:

The Securities Fraud Case

As we posted in 2009, five former executives pleaded guilty, the former CEO and Chairman Charles McCall was convicted of fraud in 2009. The company settled investor lawsuits in 2005 for $960 million.

The First Pharmaceutical Pricing Case

As the Wall Street Journal reported in 2009,

McKesson Corp., a giant drug-wholesale and -distribution company, agreed to pay $350 million to settle cases in which it was accused of helping to increase drug prices in 2001 and 2002. The money will go to health plans that pay for drugs and consumers who paid co-pays for their medicines.

The San Francisco-based company said the settlement, which is subject to court approval, includes 'an express denial of liability of any kind' but that it decided to settle the cases to avoid the uncertainty of litigation

In addition, as we noted here, the company settled with the state of Connecticut for "illegal and deceptive" pricing practices for a mere $15 million.

These settlements appear to be precursors of the just announced one.

The Propofolol Punitive Damages

As we noted here, McKesson was one of three companies to collectively pay $162 million in punitive damages in a case involving allegations that the companies sold propofolol, an injectable anesthetic, in reusable containers that were susceptible to contamination with the hepatitis C virus.

The Best-Paid CEO in America

All these legal issues notwithstanding, late in 2011, McKesson leadership made headlines for a different reason. Based on one method of computation, the company's CEO was the best-paid of an exceedingly well-paid 2011 CEO class. An article in the Daily Beast noted:

John Hammergren, [is] the CEO of the McKesson Corp., a giant medical-supply company in California. Hammergren is the $145 million man, top dog on the latest listing of the country’s highest-paid chief executives.

The details of the compensation package included,

Yet last year McKesson contributed more than $13 million just to Hammergren’s pension, according to company documents. Among the other perks he enjoys: a chauffeur to drive his company car, free use of the corporate jet for personal travel, and an extra $17,000 a year to pay for a financial planner because handling all those hundreds of millions is no doubt complicated stuff.

Also,

Then there are the assorted perks he gets each year at an annual cost of $1 million or so. Choose the perk that makes you the most jealous. Maybe it’s this line found in McKesson’s most recent proxy statement: 'For security, protection, and privacy reasons, the Board has directed our CEO to use the corporate aircraft for both business and private travel.' Or maybe it’s the bounty that awaits Hammergren on the other side of his retirement. The company discontinued its pension program for ordinary employees in 1997 but not for top executives. If Hammergren quit tomorrow, according to company filings, he would receive a pension valued at $125 million.

The party won’t stop once the 52-year-old Hammergren retires. Among his lifetime benefits: a personal assistant and office, which the company figures will cost more than $200,000 a year, and the services of a financial counselor—a perk that will eat up $350,000 in profits, according to company estimates. The goodies keep coming even after he dies. If his wife survives him, she will continue receiving his base salary for six months and will also get $2 million in cash. That cash bonus would actually cost the company nearly twice that amount, as it's promised to cover the widow’s cost of paying taxes on that money.

And then there’s a provision so outsize it’s drawn the attention of corporate-governance watchdogs like GMI, the research group that put Hammergren in the top spot of its latest survey of CEO salaries. If Hammergren loses his job due to a change in ownership, he receives an immediate $469 million payout, GMI found—giving him perverse incentive to see it happen.

Although Mr Hammergren has not been the best paid CEO every year, the Daily Beast article showed how much he has made over the years:

Hammergren’s annual total compensation payouts, taken from the company’s public filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission: $46 million in 2011; $55 million in 2010; $37 million in 2009; another $41 million in 2008. Hammergren hadn’t founded the company. Wall Street analysts covering McKesson can tell you of the disappointments and miscues that have marked his tenure. But his haul in the 13 years he has been running McKesson? More than $500 million, according to data provided by Equilar, an executive-compensation data firm.

It then contrasted this consistent largess, spiced with the 2011 results, with the company's long-term financial performance. After the scandal that eventually resulted in crimincal convictions for some McKesson executives:

'They had to give the CEO job to somebody, and basically he was the last man standing,' said an analyst who has been covering McKesson and its competitors since the 1990s. Many in the industry had never heard of Hammergren when he took over as president and co-CEO in 1999, this analyst said, 'but I guess it’s better to be lucky than good.' Hammergren became sole CEO in 2001.

McKesson’s stock had hit a high of just under $95 a share but fell below $20 after the scandal broke. Hammergren deserves credit for stabilizing the company—some might even say he rescued McKesson—but a long-term shareholder could be forgiven for feeling that the company’s board of directors has been overly generous to its chief executive. As of Friday, the stock was trading at $78 a share—still off its 1998 high. Factoring in the regular dividends the company has paid over the years, a shareholder’s investment would be worth slightly more than it was 13 years ago.

Summary

So Mr Hammergren's corpulent compensation is vastly out of proportion not only to the company's woeful ethical performance, but also to the long-term wealth created for its owners, that is, its shareholders.

So McKesson provides just the latest example of how the top hired leaders of health care organizations seem to monumentally prosper no matter how badly their organizations fare in terms of ethical performance, good done for patients and health care, or long-term financial performance. (See recent examples here and here, and our posts on executive compensation here.)  As we quoted a McGill economics professor who was writing about the global financial collapse, "all this compensation madness is not about markets or talents or incentives, but rather about insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit."

To truly reform health care, we must stop this compensation madness. We must make health care leaders accountable for their organizations' effects on patients' and the public's health, and make sure they get reasonable, not royal compensation reasonably related to their organizations' performance, including ethical performance.

Some of WellPoint's Owners (Stockholders) Allege Their Hired Executives Hid Political Contributions

We have frequently had reason to question the actions of WellPoint, the second largest for-profit health insurance company/ managed care organization in the US. 

Hidden Political Contributions

The Washington Post reported yet another one,

Health insurance giant WellPoint is the latest target of an increasingly aggressive campaign to force disclosure of corporate political and lobbying expenditures, including payments to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which has become more active in elections over the past decade.

The WellPoint campaign, set to be formally announced Thursday by a coalition of activist investor groups, demands the resignation of two WellPoint board members, including Susan Bayh, the wife of former senator Evan Bayh (D-Ind.), for allegedly failing to oversee 'high risk political spending.'

The shareholder coalition cited WellPoint’s reluctance to answer questions about a transfer of $86 million from the health insurers trade association to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 2010, when the Chamber was actively opposing President Obama’s health-care overhaul. WellPoint is a member of the association, America’s Health Insurance Plans.

'This is the most egregious clandestine campaign funding we have ever seen,' said Michael Pryce-Jones of the CtW Investment Group, a labor-affiliated organization that is part of the shareholders’ coalition, referring to the payments from the trade association to the Chamber of Commerce.

However,

At WellPoint, officials dismissed the notion that the company has been secretive about its political giving. On the contrary, spokeswoman Kristin Binns said, the firm discloses a great deal on its Web site.

'WellPoint complies with all disclosure requirements under federal, state and local laws,' she said, noting that the company publishes a 'very extensive' annual report on its political contributions.

But,

That report does not include details of the sort of special payment that the shareholders coalition said WellPoint made to the health insurers association.

So, to summarize, WellPoint management is accused of spending tens of millions on political lobbying while hiding the spending from the public and from the company's nominal owners, that is, its stock-holders, by laundering it through a third party.

WellPoint's Sorry Ethical Record

This is just the latest questionable behavior by WellPoint we have discussed. Previously, we have noted incidents in which the company  ...
 

• settled a RICO (racketeer influenced corrupt organization) law-suit in California over its alleged systematic attempts to withhold payments from physicians (see 2005 post here).
• subsidiary New York Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield misplaced a computer disc containing confidential information on 75,000 policy-holders (see 2007 story here).
• California Anthem Blue Cross subsidiary cancelled individual insurance policies after their owners made large claims (a practices sometimes called rescission).  The company was ordered to pay a million dollar fine in early 2007 for this (see post here).  A state agency charged that some of these cancellations by another WellPoint subsidiary were improper (see post here).  WellPoint was alleged to have pushed physicians to look for patients' medical problems that would allow rescission (see post here).  It turned out that California never collected the 2007 fine noted above, allegedly because the state agency feared that WellPoint had become too powerful to take on (see post here). But in 2008, WellPoint agreed to pay more fines for its rescission practices (see post here).  In 2009, WellPoint executives were defiant about their continued intention to make rescission in hearings before the US congress (see post here).
• California Blue Cross subsidiary allegedly attempted to get physicians to sign contracts whose confidentiality provisions would have prevented them from consulting lawyers about the contracts (see 2007 post here).
• formerly acclaimed CFO was fired for unclear reasons, and then allegations from numerous women of what now might be called Tiger Woods-like activities surfaced (see post here).
• announced that its investment portfolio was hardly immune from the losses prevalent in late 2008 (see post here).
• was sanctioned by the US government in early 2009 for erroneously denying coverage to senior patients who subscribed to its Medicare drug plans (see 2009 post here).
• settled charges that it had used a questionable data-base (builty by Ingenix, a subsidiary of ostensible WellPoint competitor UnitedHealth) to determine fees paid to physicians for out-of-network care (see 2009 post here). 
• violated state law more than 700 times over a three-year period by failing to pay medical claims on time and misrepresenting policy provisions to customers, according to the California health insurance commissioner (see 2010 post here).
• exposed confidential data from about 470,000 patients (see 2010 post here) and settled the resulting lawsuit in 2011 (see post here).
• fired a top executive who publicly apologized for the company's excessively high charges (see 2010 post here).
• California Anthem subsidiary was fined for systematically failing to make fair and timely payments to doctors and hospitals (see 2010 post here).

Yet despite this amazing recent record, WellPoint's top executives continue to prosper.  Earlier this month the Indianapolis Star reported that WellPoint Chair and CEO Angela,

Braly, 50, received 2011 compensation valued at $13.2 million, according to an Associated Press analysis of the Indianapolis company's annual proxy statement. That represents a 2 percent drop compared with 2010.

Braly, who has served as CEO for nearly five years, received a $1.1 million salary in 2011, a total that has stayed flat since 2008. Her compensation also included a performance-related bonus of nearly $1.9 million, stock and option awards totaling about $10 million and $216,279 in other compensation.

While her compensation dropped 2%,

WellPoint's earnings fell in the final three quarters of last year compared with 2010, capped by a 39 percent drop in the fourth quarter. In total, the insurer's earnings sank 8 percent compared with 2010.

The compensation above did not take into account that

Braly also made about $6.9 million last year mostly from previously awarded restricted stock units that had vested.

Summary

WellPoint CEO Angela Braly, like many of her fellow top hired managers of health care organizations, has become more wealthy every year despite her company's record of questionable conduct, and out of proportion to her company's financial results.

Based on illusory promises of greater efficiency that would benefit everyone, we have handed health care over to large, increasingly for-profit organizations, and we have handed control over these organizations to hired managers. We have made these managers accountable to no one, so they seem to run their organizations to benefit themselves first. Is it any surprise that organizations run to benefit top insiders do not much benefit patients' or the public's health?

Maybe the campaign by some of WellPoint's nominal owners to at least make what the company pays to influence politics transparent is a tiny first step to making the leadership of health care organizations accountable both to the organizations' owners (when they exist) and to patients and the public at large. Until they become so accountable, do not expect any improvements in health care cost, quality or access.

Despite Recalls, Legal Settlements and Guilty Pleas - A $143.5 Million (or Perhaps $197 Million) Golden Parachute for the Former Drug Representative Who Is Now CEO of Johnson and Johnson

After 30 separate product recalls since 2009, and multiple legal settlements and guilty pleas, we noted that the former pharmaceutical representative who is now the CEO of Johnson and Johnson will be retiring. 

The $143.5 Million (or Perhaps $197 Million) Golden Parachute

The Wall Street Journal just reported his retirement will come with an immense golden parachute:

Johnson & Johnson Chairman and Chief Executive William Weldon stands to collect pension benefits and deferred compensation currently valued at $143.5 million after his retirement, according to new details released by the health-care conglomerate.

The details were:

Mr. Weldon, who will be succeeded as CEO by Vice Chairman Alex Gorsky, stands to collect benefits from two main sources. The present value of his accumulated pension benefits is $48.4 million, portions of which are paid out as a monthly annuity for life, according to Wednesday's filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

His pension's value places Mr. Weldon well into the top 10% of CEOs of Standard & Poor's 500 companies, said Paul Hodgson, chief communications officer and senior research associate at GMI Ratings, which tracks corporate-governance information.

Mr. Weldon also has amassed $95.1 million in nonqualified deferred-compensation plans. This represents parts of his salary and bonus that had been deferred in prior years, as well as company contributions to savings plans. Portions of Mr. Weldon's deferred compensation have been recorded each year as part of his total annual pay.

Of the $95.1 million, more than $70 million represents Mr. Weldon's accumulated balance from a legacy cash-incentive plan that J&J has discontinued and replaced with a new executive-compensation plan. This sum would be paid to Mr. Weldon at retirement, J&J said. All deferred compensation is subject to taxes.

Actually, an argument that the $143.5 million figure is an major under-estimate appeared in the Shearlings Got Plowed blog:

The MSM reports calculate only the cash values for soon to be Ex-CEO Weldon, not the present value of his stock options, at today's NYSE closing price for J&J of $65.08. So, that -- plus the vesting of his February 2012 JNJ RSUs and Stock Option awards [see page 45 of the link (but such amounts are ommitted from the year end 2011 proxy, on which the WSJ relied)] -- add about $53.47 million to the Weldon walkaway haul.

Thus, Mr Weldon's golden parachute may be as big as $197 million.

The Board's Justification for the Riches

Of course, the Johnson and Johnson board justified the latest additions to Mr Weldon's wealth, as reported by the WSJ:

In a regulatory filing Wednesday, the board said Mr. Weldon 'successfully managed our company through a challenging economic environment in 2011,' with solid financial results and advances in J&J's pharmaceutical pipeline.

The board added that while J&J made progress in addressing manufacturing-quality issues in 2011, 'continued focus is needed to address critical product supply and quality issues that impact our responsibility of being able to deliver products to patients and customers who need them.'

Johnson and Johnson's Recent Record

The board's upbeat assessment sharply contrasts with Johnson and Johnson's actual recent record.

As we discussed recently, Johnson and Johnson seems to have lost the ability to manufacture high quality products. It has had to make 30 separate product recalls since 2009. The latest was Liquid Infant Tylenol. (The current WSJ Health Blog list of recalls can be found here.)  This seems to be more than a "rough patch," which is how the WSJ article described the manufacturing problems.

In addition, the WSJ article failed to mention that Johnson and Johnson also has an amazing recent record of ethical lapses and guilty pleas, including:
- Convictions in two different states in 2010 for misleading marketing of Risperdal
- A guilty plea for misbranding Topamax in 2010
- Guilty pleas to bribery in Europe in 2011 by J+J's DePuy subsidiary
- A guilty plea for marketing Risperdal for unapproved uses in 2011 (see this link for all of the above)
- Accusations that the company, which makes smoking cessation products, participated along with tobacco companies in efforts to lobby state legislators (see post here)
- A guilty plea to misbranding Natrecor by J+J subsidiary Scios (see post here)
- More recently, in 2012, testimony in a trial of allegations of unethical marketing of the drug Risperdal (risperidone) by the Janssen subsidiary revealed a systemic, deceptive stealth marketing campaign that fostered suppression of research whose results were unfavorable to the company, ghostwriting, the use of key opinion leaders as marketers in the guise of academics and professionals, and intimidation of whistleblowers. After these revelations, the company abruptly settled the case (see post here).
-  Most recently, there are reports that the company is in negotiation with the US Department of Justice to settle other lawsuits about the marketing of Risperdal, perhaps for as much as $1.8 billion (see this BusinessWeek story.)

Meanwhile, an article from the Wharton Business School suggested that the problems at Johnson and Johnson stemmed directly from former drug representative Weldon's management approach, which put short term revenues, "making the numbers," ahead of everything else, apparently including good manufacturing practices, or ethical business practices:

[University of Michigan Ross School of Business Professor Erik] Gordon argues that CEO Weldon's relentless focus on the bottom line -- the company's website touts its record of 27 consecutive years of adjusted earnings increases and 49 consecutive years of dividend increases -- is the reason for the current woes. 'Bill Weldon sets the priorities and the culture for the company,' says Gordon. And the problems, from overly aggressive marketing to underinvestment in safety and quality systems, reflect 'people trying to get their bonuses, hit their numbers and keep their job.'

No doubt the global economic collapse in 2008 put renewed pressure on managers at multinationals like Johnson & Johnson. John Kimberly -- a Wharton management professor and executive director of the Wharton/INSEAD Alliance who has worked with J&J executives in Europe since the late 1990s -- says he detected a shift among those managers starting in 2008. 'I got the sense that there were some things happening at corporate, and that messages were being sent about the need to deliver profitability,' Kimberly notes. 'It seemed as though the people I was working with were feeling pressure from above to pay closer attention to the bottom line. It was a palpable, tangible change.'

Wharton's Donaldson gives J&J management credit for the aggressive steps the company is now taking to overhaul its manufacturing processes and plants. But he also notes that the balance between profits and patients is a tricky one. Managers at J&J, he says, 'are juggling a lot of balls. In the credo, they say they put patients first and stockholders further down the line. But there is a red ball that every manager knows about, [which is] profit -- and they don't let that red ball drop.' Figuring out how to serve patients well and still deliver for Wall Street is not easy. 'J&J believes they can do both those things,' Donaldson says. 'But if the weight of one side of that formula gets too heavy, the entire structure collapses.'

Summary

The ongoing news from the once proud Johnson and Johnson, whose credo famously states:

We believe our first responsibility is to doctors, nurses and patients, to mothers and fathers, and all others who use our products and services. In meeting their needs, everything we do must be of high quality.

suggests that instead, the company's first responsibility is now to the hired managers, to obey their dictates no matter how they undermine the credo, and most importantly, to pay them so much as to make them some of the most wealthy people in the world. Johnson and Johnson has become exemplary, not of putting patients or health care professionals first, but of how hired managers took over health care, and turned it to their own advantage.

So should we trust Johnson and Johnson to do better, now that another former pharmaceutical representative will be its new CEO?

The case of Johnson and Johnson indicates why we need a huge change in how health care organizations are lead.

Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

Semi-Retirement of a Salesman - Weldon to Retire as Johnson and Johnson CEO

The extremely well compensated CEO and Chairman of Johnson and Johnson, the huge and recently hugely troubled US based pharmaceutical and device company, is going to retire, at least as CEO.  Reporting on this event may shed a little more light on the sorts of leadership problems that now commonly afflict health care organizations.

The Credo

Johnson and Johnson was once one of the US' most respected companies.  Its credo, written in 1943 by Robert Wood Johnson, bravely begins:

We believe our first responsibility is to doctors, nurses and patients, to mothers and fathers, and all others who use our products and services. In meeting their needs, everything we do must be of high quality.

Dishonoring the Credo

Yet in the last few years the company has not honored this credo.

It seems to have lost the ability to manufacture high quality products. It has had to make 30 separate product recalls since 2009. The latest was Liquid Infant Tylenol. (The current WSJ Health Blog list of recalls can be found here.)

Johnson and Johnson also has an amazing recent record of ethical lapses and guilty pleas, including:
- Convictions in two different states in 2010 for misleading marketing of Risperdal
- A guilty plea for misbranding Topamax in 2010
- Guilty pleas to bribery in Europe in 2011 by J+J's DePuy subsidiary
- A guilty plea for marketing Risperdal for unapproved uses in 2011 (see this link for all of the above)
- Accusations that the company, which makes smoking cessation products, participated along with tobacco companies in efforts to lobby state legislators (see post here)
- A guilty plea to misbranding Natrecor by J+J subsidiary Scios (see post here)
-  Most recently, in 2012, testimony in a trial of allegations of unethical marketing of the drug Respirdal (risperidone) by the Janssen subsidiary revealed a systemic, deceptive stealth marketing campaign that fostered suppression of research whose results were unfavorable to the company, ghostwriting, the use of key opinion leaders as marketers in the guise of academics and professionals, and intimidation of whistleblowers.  After these revelations, the company abruptly settled the case (see post here).

Disconnect Between Leadership Performance and Rewards

Nonetheless, until very recently, the top leadership of the company continued to collect outrageous compensation, and to be regarded as a font of health care wisdom, even by the current US administration.

In 2010, the company gave CEO and Chairman William Weldon over $29 million in compensation, saying he "met expectations," (see this post).

In 2011, just days after the company pleaded guilty in the Risperdal marketing case (above), CEO and Chairman Weldon was invited to the White House to discuss health care (see this post.)

Just after his resignation was announced a few days ago, the Wall Street Journal reported that Weldon would get an increased bonus for 2011 ($3.1 million, up from $1.98 million in 2010), and an increased base salary ($1.97 million up from $1.92 million.)  His total compensation for 2011 was not yet revealed. 

Swapping One Salesman for Another

A single New York Times article suggested one reason why Weldon's reign was ultimately so unsuccessful, and perhaps why his successor may not do better.

Alex Gorsky, the newly named chief executive of Johnson & Johnson, shares a crucial biographical detail with William C. Weldon, the man he is succeeding. Both got their starts as pharmaceutical sales representatives, a notoriously grueling job that — because it demands stamina, charisma and a near devotion to making the sale — has become a crucible for future drug company executives in recent years.

Indeed, Mr Weldon's official biography indicates he "served in several sales, marketing and international management positions." The official biography of CEO-to-be, Alex Gorsky, stated he "began his Johnson & Johnson career as a sales representative with Janssen Pharmaceutica in 1988. Over the next 15 years, he advanced through positions of increasing responsibility in sales, marketing, and management." Previously, he earned "a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., and spent six years in the U.S. Army, finishing his military career with the rank of Captain. Alex earned a Master of Business Administration degree from The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1996."

Apparently neither current nor nominated CEO had any direct experience in patient care, nor in biomedical or clinical science, nor in chemistry, engineering or manufacturing. So both are generic managers, that is, health care leaders without any direct experience in health care, or in the science and technology underlying it.

"Making the Numbers" Versus the Credo

Moreover, they are both a particular type of generic manager, salespeople. As the Times reported:

Mr. Gorsky, who is 51, fits the mold of someone who once 'carried the bag' — industry slang for working as a sales representative. He is known as a polished speaker and an intense yet likable manager who is a quick study when it comes to learning new topics.

However, while sales people may be personable, they often have goals that have nothing to do with responsibilities "to doctors, nurses and patients, to mothers and fathers,...." As the Times article also noted,

But the ethos of the sales representative may not be what Johnson & Johnson needs right now, said Erik Gordon, who teaches business at the University of Michigan. 'That culture was very much the Weldon culture writ large — we will make our numbers for the analysts, period,' he said. 'And if that means we have to cut costs on things that affect quality, then by God, we’re going to make those numbers.'

So while Johnson and Johnson for years prided itself as a company that put the needs of patients and health professionals first, it hired leaders from the culture of sales where the impetus is to "make the numbers," to fulfill short term revenue goals, no matter what. This illustrates how generic management given perverse incentives in an era that honors greed and puts short-term economic goals ahead of all others had hollowed out health care.

We wish Mr Gorsky well, but worry that if he too focuses just on making the numbers, the result will be only mischief.

The Moral of the Story

Health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.


If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

More Tales of the Hospital CEO Compensation Bubble

The hospital CEO compensation bubble continues to grow. As the year draws to a close, I have found another set of stories about outsized payments to health care executives.  While their repetitive features suggest the magnitude of the issue, they featured some twists on the usual justifications given for large compensation packages. Presented in order of the size of the compensation package.....

Maxis Health System, Pennsylvania

The Scanton Times-Tribune reported:

Mary Theresa Vautrinot, president and CEO of parent company Maxis Health System, earned a little more than $464,000 in salary and other compensation, according to 2010 tax forms filed by the hospital.

These days, compensation under a half a million dollars may not seem like all that much, but it should be viewed in context. Maxis Health Systems actually actually owns only one hospital, Marian Community Hospital. In 2010, that hospital, already small, shrunk further,

In January 2010, the 70-bed hospital scaled back operations to just 35 beds. For the past six months, Marian Community Hospital has had about 20 inpatients each day.

Now it will close:

Last Monday, parent company Maxis Health System announced the Carbondale hospital's impending closure, citing ongoing financial pressures and a dwindling patient population

$464,000 seems like a lot of money to run a tiny hospital under "ongoing financial pressure" into bankruptcy. This seems like another example of pay for poor performance.

Summa Health System, Akron Children's Hospital, Akron General Health System, Ohio

In a survey of local hospital CEO compensation, the Akron Beacon-Journal noted,

Children’s President and Chief Executive William Considine received compensation and other benefits totaling $1,560,659 in 2010.

Thomas J. Strauss, president and chief executive of Summa Health System, received a total compensation and bonus package worth $1,408,062 last year.

For Akron General, 2010 was a year of leadership transition, with a former, interim and current leader all receiving executive pay.

Alan J. Bleyer, who retired as the hospital’s leader in 2009, received $677,267 in compensation. Michael Rindler, a national health-care consultant who was interim chief executive and continued in a consulting role through the year, made $983,744.


Vincent J. McCorkle, who took over as president and chief executive on July 1, 2010, received $568,605 in total compensation last year.

Lest anyone think that these hospitals were paying their CEOs a lot of money,

Nonprofit hospital executives could make substantially more if they worked in for-profit industries, [Ohio Hospitals Association spokesperson Mary] Yost said.

'A million dollars certainly is a decent package, but it’s not the highest thing that these people could command,' she said. 'We’re blessed that there are people who want to work for a nonprofit that has the mission of serving its community and they’re not just in it for the money.'

Only within the protected world of top executives would $1 million a year seem only a "decent package."  The stock defense of lavish executive pay is an appeal to common practice, i.e., the pay is justified because so many organizations pay their executives similar amounts.  This version of the defense lacked even the common accompanying assertions that the particular executives are so brilliant and hard-working that they would be assured of a high market price.

Furthermore, let us consider another comparison.  Consider the following data,

Summa’s revenue exceeded expenses by $31.7 million, for an operating margin of about 3 percent.

Akron General Medical Center’s revenue exceeded expenses by about $8 million, resulting in an operating margin of 1.7 percent.

Parent company Akron General Health System posted a loss of about $1 million on revenue of $854,207, according to IRS filings. The health system's filings reflect investment income and the costs of providing health screenings to the public, not hospital operations, Akron General spokesman Jim Gosky said.

Revenue at Children’s exceeded expenses by about $35.3 million for a 7.4 percent operating margin.

These data implied that the CEOs of Summa and Childrens' each received compensation equal to about 5% of their organization's total operating margins. The two people who acted as CEO at Akron General received together an amount that was larger than their system's operating loss, so had they been paid $1 million less, their system would have broken even. In this case, the newspaper found no one to quote who would assert that the former CEOs' performance was so good as to command that much of the hospital's excees, or the latter CEO's performance was so good as to be worth putting the hospital system into a deficit.  

Mercy Health Systems, Wisconsin

The Janesville, Wisconsin Gazette published a story about one CEOs response to previous reporting of his compensation,

Javon Bea saw the August article in a Madison newspaper that questioned the salaries of area health care leaders.

Bea, the president and chief executive officer of Janesville-based Mercy Health System, was singled out for receiving considerably more than hospital executives in Madison.

The article was based on 2009 tax filings, which show that Mercy paid Bea $3.6 million in total compensation. That included compensation of nearly $2 million and deferred pension payments of just more than $1.6 million.

The newspaper reported that the national average was $630,000 and included base salaries, bonuses, pensions and other benefits.

Many stories of executive pay have shown leaders who make many times other employees' compensation.  In this case, however, a CEO tried to assert that he did many times other employees' work.  Bea defended his salary by arguing he did the work of at least three, perhaps six people:

Bea said the Madison newspaper story compared executives at individual operations to him, an executive of a system that has three hospitals and 61 other facilities in 24 communities in southern Wisconsin and northern Illinois.

'To equal the job description of the CEO of Mercy Health System, you'd have to (add together) the salary of the CEO of DeanCare insurance, the salary of the CEO of Dean Clinic and the salary of the CEO of St. Mary's Hospital,' Bea said. 'And then you'd better throw in the chief operating officers at all three.'


Bea said Mercy doesn't have COOs and that he does that work.

Mr Bea did not explain how he found enough time in a 24 hour day to do the work of three to six people.  This seems to be a particularly hyperbolic version of argument that the executive is so brilliant and hard-working as to command such a high market price. Perhaps Mercy does not have CEOs or COOs of individual hospitals, but its 2010 Form 990 (from Guidestar here) documents that it has ten vice-presidents who each make approximately $200,000 to over $375,000 a year. Why Mr Bea would need to do the work of three or six people when he has so many other well-executives around to help was not clear.

Furthermore, Mr Bea came up with an apparently unique justification for his high pay, that its source was some sort of magic money that did not add to health care costs,

Bea said his salary has no effect on health care costs or the premiums MercyCare subscribers pay each year. He likened his salary to capital costs, which he also said don't affect what patients are charged.

John Cook, Mercy's chief financial officer, said Medicare, Medicaid and private insurance companies don't pay providers based on the costs of capital improvements or salaries, which in Bea's case is determined by a board of directors that works with national consultants and attorneys.

'My salary isn't going to affect your health care cost,' Bea said.

Maybe Mr Bea needs a second opinion from another CFO. His compensation appears to come from the hospital system's budget, per its 990 form, so it affects hospital costs as much as any other expense of the same amount. Furthermore, it is well known that hospital systems negotiate payment rates with private insurers, and that larger systems with more market power may negotiate higher rates.  Finally, it is also well known that different hospitals collect different amounts from government insurance programs for patients with apparently similar problems.  Thus, the notion that executive pay has no effect on health care costs, and the implication that it somehow comes from a magical place outside of the budget, seems to be an entirely new rationale for huge executive compensation.  From a psychological standpoint, it appears to be based on wishful or magical thinking.  Another way to look at it is as a logical fallacy, a special pleading, an assertion without a clear basis that the usual rules or principles do not apply.

Montefiore Medical Center, New York-Presbyterian Medical Center, and Others, New York, New York

A brief article in the New York Post focused on the bonuses given to some local CEOs,

Dr. Kenneth Davis, the head of Mount Sinai hospital and medical school, raked in a $1.2 million bonus in 2010, and Michael Dowling, the CEO of the North Shore-LIJ Health System, got $1 million. Louis Shapiro, president of the Hospital for Special Surgery, got a $1.5 million bonus and $992,215 salary.

Some CEOs also got a housing allowance, car and driver, and first- or business-class air travel.

Montefiore Medical Center in The Bronx paid CEO Steven Safyer $1.4 million plus a $359,845 bonus. The hospital also put $2.2 million into Safyer’s retirement fund, which he can take only when he leaves.

In addition,

The highest total compensation — $4.3 million — went to Dr. Herbert Pardes, the retiring head of New York-Presbyterian Hospital, who got $1.7 million in salary, a $1.9 million bonus and $648,686 as “other” compensation.

The Post found someone to provide the usual rationale,

Brian Conway, a spokesman for the Greater New York Hospital Association, defended the packages.

'Hospital CEO compensation reflects their myriad responsibilities, the complexity of running a medical center, and the national market for their talents,' he said.

That was a quick one-sentence summation of the "market" and "brilliant, hard-working" arguments.  Note that, as usual, no justification of why the particular people involved should be considered particularly brilliant or hard-working, and no comparison of their dedication or brilliance to that of lesser paid hospital employees was supplied.  Note also that CEO compensation is usually determined not by the market, but by a biased benchmarking process, see post here. Note further that this process almost never includes comparisons with employees who are not CEOs, nor includes explicit comparison of particular CEOs dedication, brilliance, etc with either that of other CEOs or other employees.



Premier Health Partners, and Others, Cincinnati, Ohio

The Middletown (Ohio) Journal reported,

Jim Pancoast, president and CEO of Premier Health Partners, the parent organization of Atrium Medical Center in Middletown, had the highest pay in 2010 of information available to date from that year. Pancoast collected about $4.6 million in 2010, most of which is a lump sum paid out through a supplemental executive retirement program.

The year before saw someone get even richer compensation,

Kettering Health Network’s former Chief Executive Officer Frank Perez and UC Health’s former CEO Kenneth Hanover topped the list in 2009, with each receiving more than $2.6 million.

Frank Perez’ total reportable pay in 2009 of more than $5.5 million included a more than $4.5 million lump-sum, taxable retirement payment.

Ron Seifert, executive compensation practice leader for the health care practice at Hay Group, supplied the usual rationale,

'No one, including the boards of these organizations, denies this is a lot of money. But what they’ll tell you is this takes a special leader,' he said. 'They come with a price tag.'

As is also usual, why the particular leader should be considered so special, particularly in comparison to other lesser paid hospital employees,  was not specified..

Northwestern Memorial Healthcare System, Chicago, Illinois

Last but not least, we address the compensation given Dean M Harrison, the CEO of Northwestern Memorial Healthcare System, as discussed in an editorial in FierceHealthFinance, entitled, "The problem of 8-figure hospital paychecks and near-poor patients." In summary,

Harrison was paid an astonishing $10.2 million in 2010, the result of a $7.5 supplemental retirement fund payout.

The ire this generated, so unlike the tone in the typical news article about executive compensation,  is worth quoting:

There are hundreds of nonprofit hospital CEOs like Harrison, compensated with millions of dollars while their institutions throw a few bread crumbs to the poor living in their service areas. Many these institutions spend more on CEO pay than charity care.

Alan Sager, a professor of health policy and management at Boston University, recently told Crain's Chicago Business what a lot of healthcare pay and governance experts dare not say: 'There's an enormous sense of self-entitlement among CEOs. It started in the for-profit corporate sector, but it has sloshed over into the non-profit hospital world.'

I worked up some talking points for Northwestern Chief Financial Officer Peter J. McCanna that he can bring to the next board meeting, although I'm guessing he won't do so. For those CFOs actually willing to rock the boat, these bullet points work for practically any large urban hospital in the country:

• Dean Harrison's 2010 compensation was approximately 170 times that of a charge nurse on their feet 12 hours a day. Does Dean Harrison work 170 times harder?

• Dean Harrison's compensation was approximately 20 times that of a cardiac surgeon performing 300 to 400 high-revenue procedures a year. Does Dean Harrison provide 20 times the benefit?

• Dean Harrison's compensation could be used to cover the first 10,000 uninsured patients who come through the emergency room each year. Which would provide a greater benefit to the hospital and community?

• The purpose of a supplemental retirement plan is to ensure its recipient maintains a reasonable standard of living past their working years. Given the tens of millions of dollars Dean Harrison has already received during his career and the six-figure pension and high five-figure Social Security income he is guaranteed upon retirement, will the $7.5 million payout actually accomplish its goal? Or will it merely be gravy for his heirs?

He concluded,

Meanwhile, if your hospital has a single patient who works hard, will be bankrupted by the bill they receive, and no one on your staff has walked them through every step of a charity care claim, that is where some imagination and original thought is sorely needed.

Too much money in some places, and not enough in others. Someone needs to announce that the buck stops here. And start moving around all the other bucks.

Summary

In a health care system with ever rising costs, declining access, and stagnant quality, we no longer can tolerate the perverse incentives generated by unaccoutanably high compensation to top executives. As long as top executives continue their sense of "self-entitlement," and can continue their current management practices reinforced by ever rising pay checks, expect poor leadership to undermine any attempts to improve health care.  Tired repititions of the usual rationales, that the CEOs are brilliant and hard-working, and that their compensation is mandated by the market do not make these rationales true.
We need health care leadership that has compassion for the increasing hardships that their patients have to endure, and that puts doing the right thing for patients' and the public's health ahead of self-interest.