Showing posts with label NPfIT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NPfIT. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 27, 2012

Gartner: Famous Last Words on National Health IT - "Don't Fear Progress"

From time to time I review old articles about health IT via Google and other search engines.

Found this analysis/prediction/statement of confidence, by a research analyst at IT consultant company Gartner Group. Emphasis mine:

Don’t Fear Progress

by Brian Burke | April 17, 2009 | 1 Comment

In an open letter blog to President Obama, Burton Group Senior Analyst Joe Bugajski opines that President Obama is spewing “delusional visions of a nation-covering, interoperable, secure, private, reliable, accurate, and instantaneous electronic healthcare data network is at best terrifying and at worst pernicious.” OK – I had to look up ‘pernicious’. It’s not good.

Mr. Bugajski goes on to relate a horrifying personal experience in which he ended up in a clinic and then a hospital that both used electronic health records. He relates the story of his stay in which electronic health records hindered rather than helped and concludes that most health care professionals “longed for handwritten charts hanging at the foot of every patient’s bed.” While I don’t doubt his experience, and I disagree that building a national health information network is an unsound idea.

In fact, the National Health Services (NHS) in the UK is several years into its ‘Connecting for Health‘ program and has already built a nation-covering, interoperable, secure, private, reliable, accurate, and instantaneous electronic healthcare data network. The UK is reaping the benefits of improved treatment and cost savings. You can read additional background in my research note, Toolkit: Enterprise Architecture for the U.K.’s National Health Service (Case Study)

Mr. Bugajski is correct that the initiative will be large and costly and I also agree that the US government should approach the program with caution. But the benefits are enormous – it’s about saving lives! While I sympathize with Mr. Bugajski’s unfortunate experience, I believe moving forward on this initiative is truly one of the bright spots in President Obama’s stimulus plan.


Problem is, the NHS program to build a "nation-covering, interoperable, secure, private, reliable, accurate, and instantaneous electronic healthcare data network" failed, as I wrote at my Sept. 2011 post "NPfIT Programme goes PfffT."

The success of this program was long in doubt, as expressed by the UK's own House of Commons public accounts (audit) committee as here, published 27 Jan 2009 (four months before the optimistic Gartner piece) entitled "The National Programme for IT in the NHS: Progress since 2006 - Public Accounts Committee."

In fact, I had been writing skeptically about that program for years, including at this query link and at my academic site.

I don't fear progress.

What I fear is cybernetic hyper-enthusiasm masquerading as progress, especially when it wastes money - in this case conservatively estimated at £12.7bn - and harms patients.

-- SS

Tuesday, February 7, 2012

More cybernetic miracles: 14,000 patients failed to receive follow-up outpatient appointments

14,000 is a lot of patients to miss followup appointments. I do not think this feat could have been accomplished via paper:

Morecambe Bay missed 14,000 outpatients
E-Health Insider.com
7 February 2012
Lyn Whitfield

University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust is working through a backlog of 14,000 patients who failed to receive follow-up outpatient appointments because of administrative and IT problems.

And problems with disappearing ink and Fido, the office canine, chewing up charts, but mostly the IT.

The report of an investigation into the backlog paints a damning picture of failures at the trust, which became the first to introduce the Lorenzo electronic patient record system as part of the National Programme for IT in the NHS.

That would be, the failed National Programme for IT in the NHS, the NpfIT that went Pffft (perhaps the world's most expensive onomatopoeia, at a mere £12.7bn).

The report says the problems go back many years and have their roots in a ‘mismatch’ between demand and capacity at Morecambe Bay, as well poor management and risk practices and a culture of avoiding blame.

However, it also says the trust missed a big opportunity to identify and tackle the problems when it introduced Lorenzo [a health IT system - ed.] in June 2010, and that staff work-arounds contributed to the ultimate size of the backlog.

That is, workarounds to system flaws and 'glitches.'

Eventually, there were 37,000 access plans on the Lorenzo system for which a guaranteed access date had been missed. Many of these plans were duplicates or had not been closed.

However, 14,000 patients needed to be seen and were divided into cohorts so the trust could deal with them. All these patients should have been seen by the end of March.

For the future, the report says the trust needs to establish better systems, find ways to make sure that the board knows what is going on, encourage staff to take responsibility for dealing with problems, and curb the “mal-use” of Lorenzo by imposing “sanctions” on staff if necessary.

Once again, blaming the IT users and punishing them for not conforming to the diktats of the IT and its designers.

It also says the findings of the report, and the importance of “electronic, standardised and systematic management of outpatient follow-ups” should be shared with all providers, in case others are suffering the same problems on a smaller scale.

"In case?" It sounds like they don't even know.

... when a backlog was identified during the data cleansing process for the introduction of Lorenzo, the trust failed to recognise it as a clinical problem.

Instead, to try and solve another administrative problem – the constant cancellation of clinics – the trust introduced a ‘partial booking’ system. Patients who needed a follow-up in more than six weeks were asked to call for an appointment.

“No arrangements were made to account for the 1,000 or so calls that the clinical clerks would receive per week, whilst still trying to man the reception desk and administer the clinics,” the report says. “This created chaos and confusion for patients and staff alike.”

Sounds like a government operation to me.

Patients were often offered late appointments – “some of which arrived with the patient only after the clinic had taken place.”

All of this caused patient and GP complaints, but because they seemed to relate to administrative problems, their real, clinical nature was overlooked.

In the middle of all this, outpatient staff complained that Lorenzo was slow – although the report says there is no evidence that it was slower than the system it replaced [ignore the users - their complaints are all 'anecdotal' - ed.]and that it was more complicated to complete a booking.

As a result, “many staff found ways around that were quicker, but these were responsible for patients having multiple access plans, which helped to label the problem as administrative.”

You never have to work around something that is not in your way.

Floor walkers initially monitored such “inappropriate” use, but this stopped once Lorenzo had stabilised. [The computer police...how charming. - ed.]

Morecambe Bay is the first and most prominent of the ‘early adopter’ sites for Lorenzo, which was due to be implemented in the North, Midlands and East by CSC [an American management consulting firm - ed.] as local service provider.

The problems at the trust, CSC’s failure to complete the ‘early adopter’ programme, and critical reports from watchdogs and MPs on progress, have thrown a new LSP deal into doubt.

I presume they mean critical reports from MPs like this, and other reports like this from Parliament's Public Accounts Committee a few years back that stated, among many other findings, that:

... The [NPfIT] Programme is not providing value for money at present because there have been few successful deployments of the [U.S. Cerner] Millennium system and none of Lorenzo in any Acute Trust. Trusts cannot be expected to take on the burden of deploying care records systems that do not work effectively. Unless the position on care records system deployments improves appreciably in the very near future (i.e. within the next six months), the Department should assess the financial case for allowing Trusts to put forward applications for central funding for alternative systems compatible with the objectives of the Programme.

Charming.

CSC announced last week that it was going to lay off 500 staff, including 46 from iSoft, which developed Lorenzo, and which CSC bought last year.

I'm sure that will help speed up software remediation.

-- SS

Thursday, January 19, 2012

The Very Latest Health IT "Glitch" - Britsh MP Says No to Cerner

It's just a glitch:

Bacon calls for halt on Millennium
e-Health Insider.com
19 January 2012

Conservative MP Richard Bacon has called for a halt to all Cerner Millennium deployments following appointment problems and delays at the latest trusts to go-live with the system - North Bristol and Oxford.

Bacon, who has followed the progress of the National Programme for IT in the NHS [NPfIT - ed.] for many years, said the two hospitals had been “brought to their knees” by the implementation of the new electronic patient record system.

“These deployments need to be stopped until we are sure that they can be managed safely,” he said; adding that the system should be "switched off" if it was not working for patients.

North Bristol NHS Trust and Oxford University Hospitals NHS Trust said they are working through some deployment issues, but denied that patient safety has been compromised.

[There's that 'safety has not been compromised by major IT system disruptions' line again - see here - ed.]

However, Oxford University Hospitals told eHealth Insider that it has had to bring in extra staff to help it overcome some “temporary problems while the new system beds in.”

Bacon said local news reports indicated that the trust was having serious difficulties booking patients in for treatment.

The Oxford Mail has reported that problems were so bad before Christmas that the trust had to suspend its parking charges as clinics over-ran by hours.

... Bacon, who was instrumental in triggering last year’s National Audit Office and Commons’ public accounts committee inquiries into the programme, said the NHS should never have been locked into buying software that was “unreliable” and “unreasonably expensive."

“Effective, affordable and robust IT systems are vital to the future of the NHS, but it is clear that the fiasco that is the national programme cannot deliver them,” he said this morning.

He called for “a halt” to new Cerner Millennium deployments, including that at Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust, which is being undertaken by BT as the local service provider for London, and that at Royal Berkshire NHS Foundation Trust, which went outside the national programme more than two years ago.

[More typical hospital executive-style excuses and spin control follow]

Readers, I won't bore you with the rest of the excuses, pleadings for special accommodation, etc. You've heard them all already on this blog.

However you can read them at the link above if you so desire.

-- SS

Saturday, January 14, 2012

North Bristol Hits Appointment Problems: Another "Our Lousy IT Systems Screwed Up, But Patient Safety Was Never Compromised" Story

At my Dec. 2011 post "IT Malpractice? Yet Another "Glitch" Affecting Thousands of Patients. Of Course, As Always, Patient Care Was "Not Compromised" referencing prior posts, I wrote:

... At my Nov. 2011 post "Lifespan (Rhode Island): Yet another health IT glitch affecting thousands - that, of course, caused no patient harm that they know of - yet" I wrote:

There's been yet another health IT "glitch" that, of course, caused no patients to be harmed. See other "glitches" here, here, here and at other posts which can be found by searching this blog on the banal term 'glitch'.

Another "our clinical IT crapped out , BUT ... patient care/safety was never compromised" story just arose:

North Bristol hits appointment problems
E-Health Insider
11 January 2012
Rebecca Todd

Clinicians working at North Bristol NHS Trust have expressed concern about disruption to patient care, which they say is caused by appointment problems following the go-live of a new Cerner Millennium electronic patient record system.

I would have entitled the article "North Bristol hit by IT-created appointment problems."

Reported problems include patients being booked into non-existent clinic appointments or not being told about scheduled operations, resulting in some operations being cancelled.

No patient care compromise possible there. Who, after all, needs a timely operation? It frees up a lot of money for IT golf tournaments to let those of no value to society (i.e., the old, and those who will not admit computers in healthcare with deterministically revolutionize medicine because, well, they're magic) simply die due to delayed or cancelled surgery...

Ehealth Insider understands that some of the problems relate to the way the trust configured the EPR system; including setting up dummy clinics for which appointment letters were subsequently sent out.

It's never the software or computer's fault.

As a matter of fact, I have not seen any official response to the work of Dr. Jon Patrick at U. Sydney on the many software engineering flaws of another product of the same company. His work is entitled "A study of an Enterprise Health information System" and is at this link: http://sydney.edu.au/engineering/it/~hitru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=146. Do they have Class Action lawsuits in Australia?

In a regional BBC news report, aired on Monday evening, anonymous hospital clinicians called the implementation a “complete shambles” and said it represented a “potential danger” to patients.

According to the BBC report, the problems meant patients were being booked for impossible appointment times, such as 12.05 am, and quoted correspondence saying staff and the system were both on the “verge of meltdown."

The clinician comments are anonymous since non-anonymous reporting would get the clinicians declared health IT apostates, and then excommunicated. Non-anonymous 'whistleblowers' could also fear being sued due to possible gag clauses - the kind of clause hospital executives sign in violation of their fiduciary responsibilities to their staff and to patients. (See my 2009 JAMA letter to the editor "Health Care Information Technology, Hospital Responsibilities, and Joint Commission Standards"at this link and the much-expanded essay on the same themes "Health Care Information Technology Vendors' Hold Harmless and Keep Defects Secret Clauses" at this link.)

Martin Bell, director of IM&T at the trust, confirmed to EHI that North Bristol had experienced some “unexpected problems” in the past few weeks with some of the outpatient appointments and theatre lists.

Bell stressed, however, that patient safety had not been compromised and that this continued to be the top priority.

There's that line again. Perhaps it's part of some hospital administrator JournoList-recommended catchphrase for describing how safety was not compromised during a major workflow disruption?

He said the problems were not down to the software itself, but due to “implementation and data migration difficulties in some clinics."

Right. Quite credible.

“Our information management and technology team, supported by our suppliers BT and Cerner, have been working very hard to sort out any initial issues as quickly as possible and we are already seeing improvements,” he said.

Congratulations are due. They are seeing "improvements" in dangerous clinical IT malfunctions that should never have to have been seen in the first place, if the statement is true.

“Many wards, our two minor injuries units and the Emergency Department, are successfully using the new system." The trust is one of the largest in the South of England, with more than 1,000 beds.

Just give them time.

EHI understands that as part of the Millennium implementation, dummy clinics were set up. Patients were then sent appointment letters for these clinics in error.

EHI also understands that some patients had also not turned up for scheduled operations because they had not been informed about the booking.

Bell apologised to patients who had been “inconvenienced during this transition period” and said staff had shown real dedication to continue to deliver patient care.

What if someone had been inconvenienced into their grave, or ends up there as a result of delays? On what wavelength will the apology be transmitted?

“We firmly believe that the new system, once fully implemented, will improve services for our patients and provide real value,” he said.

That seems to be the mantra, but delivery on such promises are rare. See "Pessimism, Computer Failure, and Information Systems Development in the Public Sector" as here, Public Administration Review 67;5:917-929, Sept/Oct. 2007, Shaun Goldfinch, University of Otago, New Zealand. The article is a cautionary article on IT that should be read by every healthcare executive documenting the widespread nature of IT difficulties and failure, the lack of attention to the issues responsible, and recommending much more critical attitudes towards IT.

A £69m contract for BT to deliver Cerner Millennium to three new, or ‘greenfield’ sites in the South of England was agreed in April 2010, under the auspices of the National Programme for IT in the NHS.

That would not be the failed National Programme for IT in the NHS, the NPfIT what went PfffT, would it?

North Bristol was the last of these three sites to go-live with the system in December last year.

It followed Oxford University Hospitals NHS Trust, which went live a week earlier, and Royal United Hospital Bath NHS Trust, which was the first to go-live in July.

Cerner said it was working closely with North Bristol and BT on the recent implementation of Millennium.

“In complex and large deployments, especially when migrating from two different systems, it is always anticipated that it would take time for the new system to bed-in,” it said in a statement.

The patients are given full informed consent on this issue, right? Right?

“Across much of the trust, the deployment has worked well. However, this is a major change management project and there have been some difficulties with outpatient appointments.

Although this is not a problem with the software, Cerner is working in partnership with BT and trust staff to resolve any issue as quickly as possible.”

Link: BBC News

Right. Perhaps this software and claim needs testing - in a court of law.

The only thing missing is the word "glitch", though I am including that term in this posting's index, since I consider it another story in the ever-growing health IT "glitch" series.

-- SS

Addendum:

A reader sent me this comment:

How can anyone claim the problems at N. Bristol are unexpected. they are EXACTLY the same problems encountered in Taunton five years ago.

The Somerset Trust had sixteen cancelled go live dates and when Cerner 'Millennium" (note: they never defined which Millennium...) was switched on the whole hospital went into slow-motion.

Appointments could not be made at out-patient reception desks while patients waited and therefore had to be posted on. Twenty-four whole time equivalent clerks had to be employed to manage the back-up of appointment requests. So much for enhanced efficiency and cost savings.

The only possible response to this news is again to remind people of Einstein's famous definition of insanity: "repeating the same thing again and again and expecting a different result."

As for other Trusts, why no news of transformed performance by Cerner's systems at other Cerner implemented sites, Berkshire, Newcastle, Kingston, Oxford etc. The only 'good' news we get is that the system has been switched on.

If any of this expensive activity had really produced data, efficiency or cost gains, we would be drowning in Cerner press releases, the silence can only mean one thing, that their system is performing as poorly at other sites as it has in the South West.

Contrast this with the output and data produced openly by Birmingham University Hospital from its in-house created IT system.

Unfortunately one can only draw one serious conclusion about the whole Cerner/ NHS debacle - to paraphrase Mr. Clinton - "It's the (imho substandard) software, stupid!

This story needs serious investigation ... Recently US news items have started to discount the supposed efficiency gains for e-Health implementations and started to emphasize data capture and patient safety as the imperative for switch on. Unfortunately for Cerner supporters (and other vendors) the US Institute of Medicine's recent report stated unequivocally that there was (to everyone's apparent surprise) no quality evidence that e-Health improved patient safety.

I would contend no drug, therapeutic equipment or operation would or could be implemented in secondary care in the absence of critical and peer reviewed evidence of benefit [emphasis mine - ed.] that has characterized the rush to switch-on substandard IT solutions in English NHS hospitals.

I note that critical, peer-reviewed evidence, especially based on prospective randomized clinical trials as opposed to anecdotal, weak retrospective observational studies, have been deemed unnecessary in health IT.

Yet serious case reports of risk and injury from credible sources are deemed the true "anecdotes" and discounted. As I've written before, the science of medicine is nearly entirely lacking in the domain of health IT.

To put it in the words of James Le Fanu (channeling Sherlock Holmes) in his very apropos essay entitled "The Case of the Missing Data: The Dog That Didn't Bark", details on contrary strands of evidence that could reasonably have been expected to appear in evidential text are absent.

-- SS