It seems American companies are good at producing really noisome commercial healthcare IT and foisting it on other countries, such as outlined at "Is clinical IT mayhem good for [the IT] business? UK CfH leader Richard Granger speaks out" and at "Cerner's Blitzkrieg on London: Where's the RAF?".
Yet another example: Software for the London Ambulance Service (LAS). From Wikipedia:
The London Ambulance Service NHS Trust (LAS) is the largest "free at the point of contact" emergency ambulance service in the world. It responds to medical emergencies in Greater London, England, with its ambulances and other response vehicles and over 5,000 staff at its disposal.
Thanks to the U.S., the inhabitants of London are now the unconsenting subjects of an American IT beta-testing experiment that could cost them their lives.
From E-Health Insider.com:
LAS plans for IT go-live and failure
E-Health Insider.com25 January 2012
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust may terminate its contract with American supplier Northrop Grumman if a second attempt to go-live with a new dispatch system fails.
The trust initially attempted to launch the CommandPoint computer aided dispatch system in early June last year.
However, the technical switch-over to the new system had disastrous effects; with the system failing, staff having to use pen and paper, and then finally aborting the go-live by reverting to the old CTAK dispatch system.
Health IT can kill you ever before you ever reach the hospital...
An investigation into the incident has found the response to calls was delayed by more than three hours in some cases. One patient has lodged a legal claim for the delay he experienced, and the service has received four additional complaints.
A patient died in one of the calls affected. However, a separate investigation concluded that it could not be determined whether they would have survived if the response had been faster.
In other words, the patient very well might have survived without long delays for the ambulance to arrive.
Board papers drawn up for a board meeting next week say an investigation into the 8 June go-live attempt concluded that critical configuration issues were not identified during the testing phase.
It also found there were no operational procedures in place in the event of a critical system failure and that the product failed to deliver the system, technical and operational functionality expected.
At least in this case an absolution for the software itself was not made. One wonder if the vendor was "held harmless" contractually for this somber outcome.
The trust has since been working to further test the system, and is planning to go-live again on 28 March.
However, the trust’s director of information management and technology, Peter Suter, said if that go-live failed then “the contract with Northrop Grumman would need to be reconsidered.”
That will make two chances to get it right. In life-critical IT, I would only have given one.
A defective first-responder system is, on first principles, a public health menace. There is nothing to argue here, nothing to discuss on that point.
I note that disrupting the first-responder system in London would be the envy of terrorists, especially at the time of the London 2012 Olympic Games. However, who needs them when you have U.S. IT personnel who create a system as described?
The trust completed testing the software prior to Christmas, when it began training staff. Leading up the March go-live, the software will be subjected to four separate live runs, with the system staying live for progressively longer periods of time.
If the system fails to go live in March, the trust will abandon any further attempts to go-live before the Olympics in July.
That's still very tight timing to discover all the bugs in an IT system, in preparation for expected increased need during the Olympics...
Instead, it will keep operating the current CTAK system. However, the trust decided to procure a new system in 2007 because CTAK was deemed ‘unstable’ and in need of replacement.
An analysis of the CTAK system has now determined it is stable enough to handle the increased pressure during the Olympics, which is estimated to be an increase of 5.6% to 8.9% on top of the usual volume for this time of year.
One wonders if the "new system" was not needed at all, but was instead sold as vaporware by impressively attired, good-haired, shiny-toothed, fast-talking salespeople to hapless decision-makers with all sorts of promises of cybernetic and financial miracles.
(I've been in that game before from both sides - as a potential customer, and as part of a health IT sales team.)
One also wonders if, should the system be dismantled due to a second failure, the British taxpayers who paid for it will get their tax dollars refunded.